# Journal of Administration Overseas

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# Editor's Notes

"The Rural Base for National Development" was the subject for the 1968 Cambridge Conference on Development which ended on 4th April to the now traditional strains of the pipes of the Irish Guards. Once again under Dr. Ronald Robinson's inimitable chairmanship, the participants, many of international distinction and from many lands and walks of life, successfully made common purpose over the problems they confronted together and gained mutual benefit from a fruitful exchange of ideas and experience in the uninhibiting open forum atmosphere which provides the special melody of these conferences.

The conclusions reached were hopeful: that modern technology might well enable many developing countries in the coming decade to meet their own food requirements and substantial surpluses of farm products besides; that rural development might yet prove the best success story emerging from the "development decade". A note of warning was also struck: unless rural industry was rapidly expanded and the maximum use of labour stimulated, the very breakthrough to agricultural self-sufficiency which was envisaged could well lead to a most serious state of rural unemployment with all the dangers of political unrest that this could imply.

In our Quarterly Notes we include brief Impressions of the Conference contributed by three of the members attending. Very relevant to the theme of the Conference are articles which we publish in this Number by Mr. Pickering who tells how an agricultural breakthrough is being achieved in the arid lands of Baluchistan, and by Professor Gable on the exploitation of the Sunderban forests, also in Pakistan.

During the past decade a large number of very small national units have achieved independence or at least self-governing status. Nearly all of them had previously depended on the expertise of a metropolitan power for the management of their public affairs. Now they greatly need advice as how best to organise their own government departments, but their very "micro" character as Mr. Geoffrey Burgess points out, in the first contribution, mitigates against the value of advisers whose own experience and/or research has been concentrated on larger units. There is "a risk of a gap growing between what the situation and the new clientele of technical assistance need and what is being presently supplied." Mr. Burgess provides fresh guidelines which both these countries and their advisers would do well to bear in mind.

Few political scientists have wider African experience than Professor Tordoff and we welcome the opportunity to publish the first part of his article on Provincial and District Government in Zambia - to use the new nomenclature. The need for the optimum decentralization in planning and plan implementation has already been stressed by Nigel Heseltine and others. This is further emphasised by Professor Tordoff who provides examples of provincial frustration and irritation at delays and prevarication at the centre holding up development projects in the field. His spotlight also

turns on the need for better administrative machinery in the Provinces - particularly for development committees of manageable size, and the extent to which constructive criticism is forthcoming and acceptable in Zambia argues well for the reforms now under way to facilitate the execution of up-country development plans. Already Provinces receive block votes which enable them to get projects under way before the itemised allocation of funds can be made.

Finally, we are very glad to be permitted to reproduce Sir Andrew Cohen's talk on Development in Africa which he gave last November at a joint meeting of the Royal Africa and Commonwealth Societies. The key problems are catalogued and the manner in which Britain can best provide assistance is outlined. Particular emphasis is laid by Sir Andrew Cohen on the importance of continuity: as he says in conclusion, "Aid, if it is to be of any use cannot be turned on and off like a tap. One cannot plan just for a year ahead. We should enter into commitments for three or four years ahead . . ."

## SIR ANDREW COHEN

Sadly and proudly this Journal records the loss of its founder, Sir Andrew Cohen, the driving force behind Britain's effort to help developing countries and one of the greatest of her public servants.

Administration for him was never an end in itself. He used its power as a means, however imperfect, to carry out convictions. A passionate liberal-democrat, humanist and internationalist, he was behind the scenes the architect of the comparatively elegant and constructive British decolonisation of tropical Africa. As Governor of Uganda he devoted his abundant energies to the speeding up of the country's economic and political development. He was the champion and organiser of the Ministry of Overseas Development and an influential leader of the international movement to aid the Third World and discover the secrets of a new science of development. The Cambridge conferences and the Institute for Development Studies are his monument.

He was an administrator but never a bureaucrat; an eccentric—part-poet, part-cricketer, part-intellectual, but never a bore; he was an idealist who never lost sight of his ideals in trudging administratively towards them. Obviously he had tremendous force; yet he was gentle and never proud. Being all this as he was, who can replace him?

# Administrative Development in Smaller Countries—The Capacity of Technical Assistance to meet their special problems

By GEOFFREY BURGESS

Mr. Burgess was lately a Public Administration Consultant to the United Nations.

THE title of this article requires brief initial explanation. The eventual purpose of an article such as this is usually to suggest solutions, or to arrive at conclusions which may facilitate finding solutions, to problems. The title of the present article may appear more likely to provoke questions than to answer them. Accepting that technical assistance is provided to help solve administrative problems, the title assumes firstly that the nature of the problems commonly met in discussing national systems of administration may be so influenced by a single factor, the size of the national unit considered, as to require special solutions appropriate to that size; secondly that the present capacity of technical assistance to contribute to the solution of problems may vary with the nature of the problems and hence with the size of the unit. The succeeding observations are intended to stimulate discussion on this position.

The first proposition that must be made is that there has in fact already occurred, in the twenty-odd years during which technical assistance has been available, a profound change in the size of national units, and particularly of those national units which now and in the future may be expected to utilise technical assistance. This may best be illustrated with reference to membership of the United Nations:

(*a*) Taking the beginning of 1957 as marking a half-way stage in the growth of the United Nations, there were at that time eighty members. Their average population was over twenty-seven million. They included the majority of the developed countries. But they also included a substantial proportion of developing countries, including such population giants as India, Indonesia, Brazil, Pakistan, and it is unlikely that the average population of the developing countries differed materially from the group norm.

(*b*) Between 1st January, 1957 and 31st December, 1965, thirty-eight new members were admitted. All, with two exceptions, had formed component parts of colonial empires and had been administered as components of major entities having access, particularly for the vital management and professional staff, to the wide resources of the administering power. At independence they ceased to be parts of such major entities and became administrative entities in their own rights, relying on their own resources. Only one, Nigeria, had a population exceeding the average for the pre-1957 group. The average population of the group, including Nigeria was 5.2 million, a

fifth of that of the earlier group, and, if Nigeria were excluded, was 3.8 million or one-seventh of the figure. During the period the tendency was for the new countries to become steadily smaller, as the decolonization of major land areas drew to its close and smaller territorial areas were dealt with. The list includes nine states (almost one fourth of the new admissions) with a population of one million or less, that is with population less than one twenty-seventh of the average for the earlier group.

(*c*) In the calendar years 1966 and 1967, admissions to the United Nations numbered four. All had been subject to colonial rule. The average population was a little over half a million, less than one-fiftieth of the average of the first group.

The membership of the United Nations illustrates the trend towards smallness in national units, but does not necessarily give a complete picture. There are a growing number of small units which are internally self-governing although not independent, and which in becoming so have substituted acceptance of responsibility for their own internal administration for reliance on the administrative resources of major units. There are even small units which are independent but so small that membership of the United Nations is not being sought. The Island of Nauru with a population of 5,000 is the latest.

These new small states, now facing a future of administrative self-reliance, are the prospective clients of technical assistance, whether bilaterally or multilaterally provided. It would seem appropriate therefore to consider what technical assistance, as at present organised, has to offer them.

The answer can be summarised in two words: experience and knowledge. The experience is often the personal experience of practising administrators. The knowledge covers experience generally, organised, analysed, in some cases synthesised, studied and recorded. It is what is comprised in the study of Public Administration. Experience and knowledge may coincide in one individual. In other cases an individual may base a claim to expertise in either one or the other, on personal experience *or* study, or on both. The question arises whether the available experience and knowledge are so clearly relevant to the problems of the newer states as to be useful in solving their problems. We may deal with the question of knowledge first.

Public administration has been a practised art since communities of any size existed. Like other arts, it was a subject of discussion among its practitioners, wherever there developed enough intellectual sophistication to make discussion attractive and enough administrative sophistication to provide a worthwhile basis for it. This process led to the slow emergence of a small volume of documentation. The *Arthashastra*, an early treatise on public administration, made its bow in India over twenty centuries ago, and there are Chinese documents of similar age. In addition there appeared also a small volume of what, at any given time in any given homogeneous area, might be described as "accepted doctrine".

In the first half of the Twentieth Century, public administration, in addition to being a subject of discussion by practitioners, became substantially a subject of investigation and analysis by academics, notably in the universities of the United States. This led to the flow of documentation expanding from a trickle to a torrent, often the product of more elaborate and more intensive research than the practitioners of the art had had the leisure

to carry out or the means to publicise. This in its turn produced a new volume of what might be described again as "accepted doctrine," at times sought to be universalised as ascertainable law, at others more modestly put forward as indicating guidelines within which administrations could develop, subject to environmental considerations.

Documentation and doctrine originated and relied heavily, in some aspects almost exclusively, on practices carried on in environments of above average administrative and cultural sophistication, which meant in practice largely in the developed countries of Europe and North America and in the areas controlled by them. Many of these practices were similar, perhaps because the ingredients in the environment liable to influence decision thereon were similar. Many of the problems encountered were also similar and consequently many of the conclusions drawn were alike. It was this apparent uniformity of question and answer, largely the result of similar environments of thought and action, which increased the temptation in the earlier states to attempt to universalise lessons of administrative experience and to extend the validity of conclusions drawn from observation of a particular environment or type of environment to cover all spheres.

In general, the national units of Europe and North America, and particularly those in which early discussion of administrative processes was marked, were large units, that is controlling substantial numbers over substantial areas. The Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century have seen the aggregation of numerous small units into a few large units. The units sometimes became even larger by the acquisition of colonial territories where they applied their administrative expertise and extended the area of application of their administrative theories. The result was that the Twentieth Century commenced with much of the area of the world administered either as national units or as parts of empires of substantial size. There were, of course, exceptions. In Europe, Lichtenstein, Andorra, San Marino, Monaco escaped the associative process and retained their independence and individuality. But, in general, size became accepted as a normal attribute of national status and exceptions were regarded as atypical. There were a few states relatively small in terms of population and of size in Central America, and in terms of population in South America. But small national units elsewhere could be counted on the fingers of both hands. As a result, the study of public administration, as it developed in administratively and educationally sophisticated national environments, found itself also developing in environments of national units of some size and its interests concentrating on the administrative practices of such units.

In the latter half of the Twentieth Century, the process of decolonization produced the now numerically large group of small states to which reference has already been made. This increased the variety of national units in which public administration could interest itself and some documentation did emerge dealing with the administrative arrangements of the new small states. But it was limited. There were a number of reasons for this. Firstly, the developed states, because of the sophistication and elaboration of their administrative systems, offered a more interesting field for research and analysis than the sometimes primitive, sometimes derivative systems of the new states. Secondly the mere fact that research institutions tended to be located in areas of administrative sophistication, made research into local

practices simple, cheaper and more rewarding than excursions into the new areas. Thirdly the new states required time to evolve characteristic systems to attract research. Fourthly, the political systems and policies of some new states were such as to inhibit or discourage research, especially research by nationals of countries accepting other political policies. For all these reasons, although with the growth of new states, the systems available for investigation and analysis had grown in numbers and variety, the amount of organised and analysed knowledge did not grow proportionately. Thus, when the new states turned to the providers of technical assistance to secure the benefits of existing knowledge and experience, the knowledge available seemed weighted disproportionately by practices of countries usually advanced and usually of large size, and the conclusions drawn over-much reliant on those practices.

Experience was similarly limited. A number of the advisers provided to the new countries as a form of technical assistance, were analysts rather than practitioners of the art of public administration. A number, probably larger, consisted of practitioners with the analytical capacity expected as normal in persons holding posts in sophisticated systems. Many of those provided for the Francophone countries of Africa by French bilateral aid were members of former colonial services with experience largely drawn from the performance of operative duties in colonial territories. A somewhat similar position occurred in connection with British bilateral aid, which made extensive use of members of the former Indian and Colonial Services. These persons had a substantial asset, as advisers, of possessing knowledge of local conditions and a perhaps greater appreciation of local community attitudes and behavioural patterns than other people with experience restricted to the metropolitan countries. But essentially their experience had been obtained in large organizations and the operative experience which they contributed in addition to the body of organized knowledge provided by the analysts, suffered from a similar limitation - of being connected with the more sophisticated systems of large units whether national or imperial. It would thus appear that the growing group of small national units, appealing for technical assistance to solve administrative problems, were liable to be answered with advice, based on knowledge and experience linked mainly with the administrative practices of larger units.

It may be asked if that matters; if there is, in fact, such a difference based on size as to render what is available something less, or less appropriate, than what is wanted. For this purpose, it is tempting but unnecessary to lay down at this stage some dividing line between the "smaller states" of the title and others. In practice the dividing line can be drawn at a number of quite arbitrary points. One solution might be to regard a population below one million as a suitable criterion, and of states with such populations there are, as has been pointed out, already thirteen as sovereign state members of the United Nations and many more as self-governing units—certainly enough to justify an investigation of problems peculiar to this size, provided such problems really exist. The proviso is vital and to it attention should now be turned. To deal with it, perhaps the most enlightening approach would be to attempt to summarise what has earlier been described as "accepted doctrine," drawn from the recorded knowledge and experience available in public administration and see if it can be applied to small units.

It is a difficult exercise to try to do so and every country and indeed almost every student might have a version differing somewhat from each others. But if asked to condense it into the prècis of not more than one hundred words beloved by examiners, the product from many would run somewhat as follows:—

> Government should be organized into sufficient agencies so that to each of them can be allotted an exclusive and preferably cohesive group of functions to be carried out subject to the co-ordinating control of a single central policy decision-making agency. The agencies should discharge their functions through staff of adequate quality, attracted and retained in a structural service by suitable working conditions, which include recruitment on merit, career arrangements ensuring treatment consonant with human dignity and permitting self-betterment through training and promotion, following devised and regulated working methods appropriately remunerated.

This "accepted doctrine" might be considered as being as much applicable to small units as to the large units from the observation of which it was derived. To that extent there are no problems peculiar to smaller countries. The problem of all countries large and small is essentially of maximising managerial efficiency within the bounds of available resources. But if size does not affect basic problems it indubitably affects available remedies. The purpose of this article is to suggest that solutions conforming to the terms of the accepted doctrine, available to and successfully applied in larger units, may be unavailable to small units, and if they were available, may well be inappropriate. In other words, the basic problems is less of problems peculiar to small size than of solutions unavailable to small size.

The proposition that administrative arrangements depend on size would not be questioned in the private sector; the management practices (and that is what public administration amounts to in the public sector) of a small business are entirely different from those appropriate for a big one and a businessman who ignored this fact would not find his business, whatever its size, long surviving. The proposition is not, in fact, really questioned even in the public sector where agencies of different size adopt different management practices as a matter of course. The management practices of a small local government unit are likely to be entirely different from those of a large unit and from those of the national unit. The difference is not explained solely by the nature of the responsibilities of the units or of their international or internal status; it derives from the fact that a small bundle of functions applied to a small clientèle are handled differently from a large bundle of functions applied to a large clientèle. In fact, the development of public administration in the modern world has been of governments learning to handle larger bundles of functions in respect of more people and in the process making necessary adjustment of their administrative structures and processes.

One of the basic adjustments in public administration, as indeed in administration of the larger business units has been the steady removal to "staff" agencies of functions, now treated as specialities, but formerly performed as part of their duties by "line" agents and still so performed in small agencies. That in essence is what has happened in turn with regard to budgeting control, personnel administration, and finally planned develop-

ment and the tendency now forms part of "accepted doctrine". Each has developed as a speciality performed by a staff agency of growing expertise. In connection with personnel administration, the process started with the removal and segregation of the recruiting function. The initial motivation in many countries was the need to control patronage but the segregation has continued, in conditions where patronage is no longer a threat, as a convenient organizational arrangement leading to greater efficiency than the system it displaced. The process was followed by the steady removal of responsibility sometimes operative, sometimes co-ordinatory, for the organization of staff, for training, for method improvement, for inspection, for assessment of staff needs for forecasting, for statistics from the "line" authorities to the establishment and public service management agencies and for preparation of future programmes to the planning agencies. The process has been justified in an assessemnt that the specialised staff agencies do in the final analysis perform specialised functions more efficiently and economically than can the unspecialised "line" agencies and that the contribution of efficiency and economy outweighs disadvantages.

This process of specialization in and division of management functions requires, for its successful operation, that there be an adequate number of persons in respect of whom the functions are exercised (*a*) to justify special staff devoted to the functions, and (*b*) to provide acceptable careers for the specialized staff. There is a certain critical mass, and if the public service falls below this, the specialization process either will not work at all or works under career conditions which are unsatisfactory or works at a high cost level for the efficiency supplied. This critical mass is easily detectable in the private sector. It is detectable also in the public (decentralized) sector. For example, a village council will generally have not proceeded to specialization and division of management functions; a town council may have proceeded in respect, for example, of budget control but not of training or inspection or methods; a large town council may have available for management the whole gamut of specialized "staff" agencies; financial control, a personnel office, a training branch, an O. & M. unit, a planning unit, a staff inspection unit. Somewhere along the continuum of size, the critical mass was met above which specialization was advantageous, below which it was not. The same may well happen in the case of national units.

A similar position arises in respect of the organization (structuring) of staff. The requirement of "accepted doctrine" included that staff should be attracted by, *inter alia*, impartial career arrangements permitting self-betterment through promotion. In practice this can be arranged, if the numbers involved in the particular careers are adequate. The smaller the number of staff in each self-contained "service," the more erratically and less impartially the system will work, until at a certain stage career advancement will depend more on chance than on the merit of the contestants. Again, somewhere along the continuum of size comes a point where this operates. Something may be gained by diminishing the number of self-contained services by amalgamation and by creating inter-ministerial services and many countries have tried this solution, but (*a*) this has only limited potentialities, (*b*) if the total public service is sufficiently small, even amalgamation will fail.

It is suggested accordingly that while for small units the "accepted

doctrine" summarized above may still provide guidelines, there will need to be given serious consideration to the means available, and the cost of the means, to secure it, especially in small units, and that in the process many of the preconceptions arising from the concentration of past attention on large units may have to be dropped. In particular, thought may be given to the following:—

(*a*) the criterion that agencies should be enough to permit division of functions into exclusive and cohesive groups may need to be replaced by an arbitrary maximum placed on the number of agencies, as has occurred in the new Nigerian states;

(*b*) The common arrangement by which each ministry is organized into a secretariat serving the minister and separate departments, may need revision in favour of complete integration of ministry and department or even of a common secretariat serving departments;

(*c*) The degree of division of public servants among self-contained services, vertically and horizontally, will need to be reconsidered; the first stage may be the amalgamation as far as is possible of separate services into inter-ministerial services; frequently this will not be possible or will not meet the case and consideration will need to be given to replacing the "public service career" aspect perhaps for special groups including scientific and technical personnel, perhaps generally, by an employment system more closely related to that existing in the private sector including pay and pension arrangements; this would mean in, effect, taking large groups out of "civil service status" and submitting them to arrangements common in the general labour market;

(*d*) The specialized "staff" functions may have to be returned to the agencies, perhaps retaining a co-ordinating agency; a particular example would be training where, in small units, reliance might have to be placed on "on the job" training or on "farmed out" training if course training were impracticable.

(*e*) Remuneration should be related more directly to agencies. This is more practicable in a smaller system where a more personal and detailed knowledge of staff is available.

(*f*) The need for caution in providing for stability of structures, conditions and rights in situations of educational and to some extent cultural and economic instability.

These may appear radical suggestions and would certainly involve the slaughter of what to many practitioners are "sacred cows". They are not mentioned as necessarily valid or necessarily appropriate. They are mentioned as solutions to which the smaller countries may be driven, and which accordingly advisers may need to bear in mind.

The new small units, whether independent or merely self-governing, are liable to be forced to re-think their administrative practices in the light of their "micro" character. The same re-thinking may be required from the providers of technical assistance. It may be that there will have to be less reliance as sources of advisers on large national units often with sophisticated systems. It may be that experience in, or knowledge based on, such units will be less valuable as a qualification for giving advice to small units. It may well be that executives of substantial local bodies in developed countries will be better fitted to advise than servants of the large national governments

of such countries. It may well be that some sort of training will be necessary to update the expertise of advisers. Whatever the position, there appears to be risk of a gap growing between what the situation and the new clientèle of technical assistance need and what is being presently supplied. Something may be done by foresight to insure against this.

# Provincial and District Government in Zambia * Part 1 at Provincial Level

By WILLIAM TORDOFF

Dr. Tordoff is Professor of Political Science, University of Zambia, on secondment from the University of Manchester.

It is commonplace to say that the colonial administrations of British Africa were far more concerned to maintain order than to promote social development. This axiom is much less valid for the post-1945, than for the pre-war, period. As J. M. Lee has shown in his recent book on *Colonial Development and Good Government*, there was among British official classes after the war "a determination to set about colonial development in earnest" and this obliged the Colonial Office to recruit more administrative officers as well as technicians to the Colonial Service.[1] The pace of development in a given dependency was determined, of course, by local circumstances and the enthusiasm shown by individual district commissioners. The political climate in Zambia (or Northern Rhodesia, as it then was) was not conducive to development and the axiom in question has therefore greater validity for this country than for many other parts of British Africa. In particular, the imposition of federation in 1953 on a reluctant people, in Northern Rhodesia as in Nyasaland, meant that the colonial (and for that matter, the federal) government was faced with a grave security problem. Moreover, a government whose rule throughout this period rested on coercion rather than consent was ill-equipped to play a mobilising role - to persuade the people themselves to participate in development. Above all, the effect of a peculiar combination of territorial exploitation and racialism was to tap the great mineral wealth of Northern Rhodesia mainly for the benefit of the white community which was strongest in Southern Rhodesia. The result was that by the time the Central African Federation was dissolved in 1963 very little development had taken place in Northern Rhodesia. Herein lay the greatest challenge to the UNIP[2] Government which took office following the party's success in the general election of January, 1964. One of the Government's most urgent tasks was therefore to transform the inherited structure of Provincial Administration - the focal point of the colonial system of government - into an instrument of economic development.

The transformation proceeded on lines similar to those already mapped out in Tanzania, which to some extent served as a model for Zambia.[3] Many of the duties formerly performed by officers of the Provincial

* This article is mainly based on discussions with politicians and civil servants; the author is of course solely responsible for the views expressed.

[1] J. M. Lee, *Colonial Development and Good Government: A Study of the ideas expressed by the British official classes in planning decolonization*, 1939-64, (Oxford, 1967), p. 35.

[2] United National Independence Party.

[3] See my book, *Government and Politics in Tanzania* (Nairobi, 1967), ch. IV.

Administration devolved on the police and ministries. The Ministry of Local Government, for example, assumed responsibility for supervising the rural local authorities.[4] The re-organization of Provincial Administration did not, however, result - as in Tanzania - in any change either in the name or the physical borders of provinces and districts. The country is divided into eight provinces and forty-four districts, the number of districts in each province from eight in the Western Province to three in the Eastern and Luapula Provinces. In addition, there are eight sub-districts (formed or in formation), representing an increase of two on the number in existence at independence. The decision to retain the original province as a unit of government rather than, as in Tanzania, to create more provinces has had both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, the old province constitutes more of a natural economic unit than a smaller one would do, while an increased number of provinces would have resulted in a serious staffing problem for the civil service. On the other hand, political authority would have been more effective and the promotion and supervision of development would have been easier within a smaller area. Moreover, given smaller provinces, it would have been less necessary to resort to the doubtful device of appointing a large number of politicians to newly-created government posts at provincial level,

As in Tanzania, each province (the Zambian equivalent of a Tanzanian region) is headed by a politically appointed representative, called a Minister of State. While most of these ministers had been UNIP officials, two had been civil servants before their appointments. Each minister is a Member of Parliament[5]: five are elected M.P.s, while three (two former civil servants and one other) are nominated; ministers who are elected M.P.s inevitably neglect their constituency work. Each minister also serves on the National Council of UNIP, which normally meets four times a year. His parliamentary and party duties at the centre take the minister outside his province for substantial periods. Unlike the regional commissioners in Tanzania, the Ministers of State in Zambia do not hold any party office in the province - UNIP has in fact no party organization at provincial level. On the other hand, most UNIP regional secretaries regard the minister as their local party boss and, in an informal way, the government machinery buttresses the party organization.

Since mid-1967 more of the Ministers of State have been posted outside their "home" areas, as part of a "nation-building" exercise; and this policy is being increasingly applied to the politicians below them. Each minister is supported on the political side by at least one Public Relations Assistant[6] and between one and four Political Assistants. There are now twelve public relations assistants (usually called Assistants to the Minister and sometimes

[4] Annual Report of the Provincial and District Government, 1964 (Lusaka, 1966) pp. 2-4, and *ibid.*, 1965 (Lusaka, 1966), pp. 3-4.

[5] Constitutionally, each Minister or Junior Minister *must* be an M.P. A Minister of State ranks as a Junior Minister. *Constitution of Zambia*, ss. 44 and 125.

[6] The full title of this officer is "Special Presidential Public Relations Assistant to the Minister of State".

"Assistant Ministers") and twenty-two political assistants in the provinces,[7] without however any obvious place in either the party or the civil service hierarchy. They are former UNIP officials - many of them have been UNIP regional secretaries - for whom a place has been found, at no cost to the party, within the "establishment". The assistant(s) to the minister and political assistants, as well as the minister himself when his duties at provincial headquarters allow, tour the province widely in order to explain government policy to the people and to check progress in implementing the National Development Plan (1966 - 70) in the various districts.

Administratively, the minister is supported by a resident secretary who is the civil service counterpart of the administrative secretary in Tanzania. Resident secretaries complain that provincial and district government (the new title has been used since 1 September, 1964) is understaffed in view of the wide miscellany of duties which administrative officers have to perform, some on behalf of other ministries not represented or not adequately represented in the field and some on their own account. The latter include co-ordinating the activities relating to the development plan, running refugee camps, and supervising both local government elections and parliamentary by-elections. Whereas at the beginning of 1964, Provincial and District Government had a staff of 227 administrative officers of whom eighteen were Zambians, by the end of 1966 there were only seventy-five administrative officers of whom fifteen were expatriates. Numbers contracted further during the course of 1967 and at the close of the year only ten expatriate administrative officers remained. Many expatriates have left the country since independence, while most of those who have stayed are employed in central government ministries; the latter have also absorbed a high proportion of capable and experienced Zambian administrative officers. The inevitable decline in the efficiency of staff since independence is in fact a more serious problem than the reduction in numbers and is a vital factor to be taken into account in reorganizing provincial and district government (now under consideration). The government is, however, aware of this problem and is taking steps to meet it - for example, by holding courses for administrative officers at the National Institute of Public Administration (the former Staff Training College) in Lusaka.

Ministers of State and their staffs face many common problems, while others are peculiar to one or two provinces. All provinces have security problems which arise from various causes. The chief causes are external, resulting from the effects of UDI in Southern Rhodesia, rebellions in the Portuguese territories, and disorders in the Congo. The problem is more acute in some provinces than in others. The Eastern Province, for example, has a common border with Mozambique. This border is so long and ill-defined that it is virtually impossible to control the movement across it of people living on either side; it is no less difficult to prevent Portuguese

[7] The distribution is as follows: public relations assistants – Western Province, which includes the Copperbelt, 4 (since October 1966): Central Province, which includes Lusaka, 2; others, 1 each. Political assistants: Northern Province, 4; Central Province, 2; Western Province, 1; others, 3 each. Both classes of officer are appointed by the President and their responsibilities are laid down in their letters of appointment. The public relations assistant ranks senior to the political assistant, while both are senior to the U.N.I.P. regional secretary – this at least seems to be the usual working arrangement.

soldiers violating Zambian soil in pursuit of fugitives from "justice" in Mozambique. Security in the Western Province is endangered because of the large Lumpa settlement at Mokambo,[8] a town on the Congolese side of the Zambia-Congo border, only a few miles from Mufilira in the Copperbelt. The "Lumpas" are the followers of Alice Lenshina, the head of the Lumpa church who has been detained or restricted since the 1964 "uprising" in which over six hundred lives were lost. When, on 24th October, 1967, Alice Lenshina escaped from the camp where she was restricted at Kalabo in Barotse Province, the government mounted a nation-wide hunt for her and, as a precautionary measure, sent a detachment of the Mobile Unit Police to Mufilira. In fact, however, Lenshina was recaptured a week later not far from Kalabo.[9]

In the socio-economic sphere, development is impeded in several provinces because of a poor communications network; the problem is most serious in Barotse Province because of the flooding each year of the Barotse plain. All provinces are short of houses and skilled manpower, and often of building materials and fuel also; these shortages have led to delays in implementing the National Development Plan. The housing shortage is most serious in the towns lying along the line of rail giving rise in Kitwe, Ndola and Lusaka to a rash of crowded squatter compounds which lack facilities for basic sanitation. In the Copperbelt areas of the Western Province the problem is compounded by severe unemployment and by periodic industrial disputes and strikes; the latter were very serious in 1966. Though the shortage of housing is above all an urban problem, the effects of the shortage are also felt in the rural areas - when, for example, the Water Affairs Department has to operate with a reduced staff because houses are not available for new recruits.[10]

Shortage of food, on the other hand, is primarily a problem which arises in the rural areas - though it has, of course, repercussions in the towns. It is a perennial problem in the Barotse Province because of the province's low ecological and agricultural potential and its general infertility. But it is a problem which, from time to time, other provinces experience too - as for example in the North-Western. Ministers of State in all provinces therefore try to persuade the people to increase agricultural production both for subsistence requirements and to build up a commercial agricultural economy. They encourage farmers to apply for loans in order to improve their individual holdings and to join together to form producer and marketing co-operative societies. Ironically, they have frequently been embarrassed because their advice has been followed: there have been serious delays both in registering new co-operative societies[11] (the responsibility of the Department of Co-operatives) and in releasing loans to farmers (for which a statutory body, the Credit Organisation of Zambia, is now solely responsible). Ministers have also experienced popular discontent over the pricing and

[8] It is estimated that there are 12,000 members of the Lumpa church living in the Congo: they are mostly scattered along the border with Zambia's Luapula Province, but more than 3,000 live near Mokambo.

[9] *Times of Zambia* (Ndola), 28th October and 1st November 1967.

[10] This was the position in the Southern Province in 1966-67 because of the housing shortage at Choma and Monze.

[11] Including building and other co-operatives.

marketing of agricultural produce. Discontent was expressed, for example, in the Northern Province in 1965 and the Northern and Eastern Provinces in 1967. In June of the latter year the Minister of State for the Eastern Province admitted that the agricultural price structure was causing him "considerable concern",[12] while in February of this year the Minister of State for the Northern Province said that the marketing arrangements for maize in his province were unsatisfactory and criticised the Northern Province Marketing Union for its ineffectiveness.[13]

Socio-economic problems which have a direct bearing on the National Development Plan are discussed by the Provincial Development Committee. This is one of the many bodies at provincial level over which the Minister of State presides.[14] It is a large body comprising, in addition to the minister, the resident secretary, the provincial development officer, the heads of government departments represented in the province, district secretaries, political assistants, regional secretaries of UNIP and other party officials (almost invariably drawn from UNIP), representatives of local and traditional authorities, and occasionally business firms. The fact that, as in Tanzania, the provincial development committees were created by administrative direction rather than by statute gives the Ministers of State a wide discretion in determining both their membership and operation. Most committees meet on average every three months to consider ministerial progress reports and to identify and resolve bottlenecks to plan implementation. Their effectiveness tends to be reduced by a number of factors, only some of which are isolated here for comment. First, the large size of the committees inhibits full discussion alike of individual projects and the development of the province as a whole.[15] Executive committees have been established in some provinces, though not in others. The boldest experiment in committee formation has taken place in the Western Province, where early in 1967 five provincial sub-committees were formed. Each sub-committee handles a group of subjects and includes representatives of local authorities, UNIP and commerce as well as government.

In the second place, some provincial heads of department resent criticism from politicians who, they feel, do not understand the issues involved. Thus at a recent meeting of the Luapula Provincial Development Committee "the political assistant . . . accused the regional forest officer of a sweet tongue and lip-service. He said much had been said to exist and yet little had been done at the plantations . . . The Regional Forest Officer rejected these accusations as unfounded".[16] Politicians, on the other hand, do fulfil a useful role in bringing popular needs to the attention of departmental heads

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[12] *Minutes of a Meeting of the Provincial Development Committee*, Fort Jameson, 28th June 1967 (mimeo.), p. 7.

[13] Parliamentary speech, reported in *Times of Zambia*, 16th February 1968. The Government is planning to set up a single National Agricultural Marketing Board in place of existing marketing services. *Ibid.*, 17th February 1968.

[14] Among the others are the Provincial Local Government Service Board, the Provincial Information Committee and the Regional Council of Education.

[15] To take some examples. The Southern Provincial Development Committee has some 50 members of whom about 40 usually attend meetings; that of the Barotse Province has approximately 45 members, of the Luapula Province 40 and of the North-Western Province 70 members. The regular membership of committees is often swelled by officers "in attendance" and others present "by invitation".

[16] Minutes, Fort Rosebery, 7-10th October 1967 (mimeo.), p. 15.

and in spurring the latter to action. Many regional secretaries, however, have not yet succeeded in converting the local party organisation into an effective mobilising agent for development; this is less true of the Luapula and Northern Provinces than of the Barotse and Southern Provinces.

In the third place, the provincial development committee is assigned the task of co-ordinating individual ministerial projects but has virtually no control over them. The primary responsibility of ministerial representatives is to their parent ministry in Lusaka and poor communications between ministry and provincial headquarters is the occasion of frequent delays in the execution of projects on the ground. Local feelings of frustration have occasionally led Ministers of State to assert themselves, as the following extract from the minutes of the ninth meeting of the Barotse provincial development committee shows:—

> "The Assistant Minister of State asked why so few co-operatives had been registered, why there was the delay in registering those that had applied, and why tractors had not been allocated to some farming co-operatives. The provincial co-operative officer was instructed to go to Lusaka and not to return until he had obtained registration of fourteen co-operatives over which unnecessary delays had occurred; even radio messages had so far been ignored".[17]

Several Ministers of State would like provincial development committees to be given executive powers, while all believe that the case for more decentralization of powers from the centre to the provinces is very strong. In a memorandum written eight months after the Development Plan was launched, the Minister of State for the Eastern Province stated:

> "Up to now . . . I see nothing but confusion. Some heads of departments have no idea about what is supposed to be done. While some centralization is good, I think that after the plan has been accepted the decentralization will greatly facilitate the implementation of the plan. I am convinced there are capable men and women in the provinces to carry out development projects. Why, for instance, should we wait for money for a good one year for a simple health centre, a small house for a court messenger, etc.? Let money be released and let us in the provinces see to the building programme. The bottleneck in the four-year plan is Lusaka and if this tendency goes on what we intend to accomplish will in the actual fact be thrown into our faces".[18]

A corollary to decentralization would perhaps be to transform the provincial development committee into a planning body - at present, it is above all an administrative body concerned with implementing a centrally-formulated plan which is broken down into regional programmes. This solution would make it essential to reverse the current trend of denuding the provinces of experienced and capable officers in favour of ministerial headquarters.

The provinces are often unfairly blamed for slow plan implementation when the real trouble lies at the centre and outside the control of provincial Ministers of State. This was certainly the experience in the first year of

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[17] Minutes, 26th July 1967 (mimeo.), IX – Any Other Business: Co-operatives.

[18] Quoted by C. Hesse, "Some Political Aspects of Development Planning and Implementation in Zambia with particular reference to the Eastern and Luapula Provinces" (mimeo.), p. 7, paper presented to the University of East Africa Social Science Conference, January 1968.

implementing the Development Plan. Some ministries were slow to commit themselves to a plan over which they felt that they had not been adequately consulted and withheld full co-operation from the Office of National Development and Planning. Officials of the latter were sometimes tactless in their approach to ministries and this fact militated against ministerial co-operation. Moreover, some ministries - agriculture for example - were reluctant to delegate sufficient responsibility to field officers. The latter were neither given clear instructions about projects in their provinces nor adequately consulted about their planning and location. As the minutes of the provincial development committees clearly show, provincial heads were therefore placed in an unenviable position when they attended committee meetings. Moreover, the committee's role as co-ordinator at provincial level was seriously impaired.

In the second half of 1967 the Government showed an increased awareness of these problems and took some steps to meet them. Ministries are beginning to show a greater plan consciousness and sense of urgency. One reason for this may be the assumption (in September, 1967) of the Office of Vice-President by Mr. Simon Kapwepwe, the former Foreign Minister. Mr. Kapwepwe's vigorous approach to plan implementation has had the effect of strengthening the authority of the Office of National Development and Planning, for which he is responsible. Moreover, some decentralization has taken place and this has had the effect of strengthening the provincial development committees. Since early in 1967 each province has been given a block vote, up to an amount of £25,000, in order to speed up the execution of a project which is being delayed through lack of immediate funds; in this case, the block vote is eventually reimbursed from the project vote. Alternatively, the block vote can be used in connection with a project approved in the National Plan, to cover (for example) the building of a small bridge giving access to the project site, but for which no specific financial provision has been made. Thus one of the main complaints lodged by the Minister of State for the Eastern Province (quoted above) has been met. The experiment has in fact proved so successful that it is to be extended: a block vote of up to £100,000 will be given to a province which has made good use of its original vote.

There are other indications that increased decentralization of responsibility for executing the Development Plan is being seriously considered. Steps have recently been taken to re-establish the provincial accounting services which were wound up at the end of 1965; it will therefore again be possible to control expenditure at provincial level. In addition, a development officer was appointed to each province in mid-1967. Development officers are administrators on the staff of provincial and district government rather than economists; they are not, in other words, the exact Zambian equivalents of the assistant directors of planning who have been appointed to Tanzania's economic zones. The development officer is the chief assistant in development matters to the resident secretary who, in a presidential directive of 19th June, 1966, has been charged (*inter alia*) with the specific responsibility of being the chief government co-ordinating officer in his province "with particular reference to the work of economic development".[19] (As we shall see, in Part II of this article, the District Secretary has corresponding duties

[19] *Annual Report of the Provincial and District Government*, 1966, p. 1.

at district level). The resident secretary, however, has so many non-developmental and routine duties to perform that he relies heavily on the development officer. In practice, it is the latter rather than the resident secretary who is usually secretary of the provincial development committee. He also serves as the liaison between heads of departments, as well as between heads of departments and the resident secretary. His job is to detect bottlenecks in plan implementation as soon as they occur and to initiate appropriate and speedy remedial action. Provincial development committees have already benefited from the presence of this officer. Each committee now has before it a serial numbered schedule of regional projects and this makes it easier for the committee to review in a systematic way the progress made in project implementation. The development officer also helps the resident secretary to keep in close contact with the District Development Committees on the one hand and, through the submission of monthly, quarterly and annual progress reports, with the Office of National Development and Planning on the other.

There is therefore an increased awareness at the centre of the need to decentralize responsibility for plan execution and certain positive steps in this direction have been taken. But, as far as the ministries are concerned, decentralization does not yet extend very far, and the block votes apart, financial control is still exercised from Lusaka. These points were made by the Minister of State for the Luapula Province at a recent meeting of his province's development committee, attended by the Vice-President. Mr. A. K. Shapi spoke about the effects of centralization of functions on the execution of the Development Plan and said:—

> " . . . except for the block votes all financial control rested with Lusaka and in many cases executive control was also vested with ministry headquarters. He said some projects had been planned, costed and submitted to Lusaka for the release of funds but the money was still not forthcoming and work on these projects could therefore not start".[20]

The committee appointed a four-man delegation to go to Lusaka in order to discuss with certain ministries and departments delays and difficulties that were being encountered in the provinces.[21] The Ministry of Works especially was subjected to strong criticism for lack of progress in the projects for which it was responsible. The Vice-President promised that delays in the implementation of the Plan caused in Lusaka would be looked into after he had reported to the President.[22]

No doubt visits such as those made by Mr. Kapwepwe to the Luapula and other provinces in October and November, 1967, do help to remove obstructions at the centre to successful plan implementation on the ground. But they are no substitute for more far-reaching measures of reform. Some administrative re-organization has taken place since independence at ministerial, provincial and district levels, while further changes in the structure of provincial and district government are impending.[23] But there

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[20] *Minutes of the Provincial Development Committee*, Fort Rosebery, 7-10th October 1967, p. 5.

[21] The Ministries/departments concerned were: Roads, Health, Local Government and Housing (Housing Division), and Works. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 21, 28.

[23] The effect of these changes may well be to strengthen the position of administrative officers at provincial and especially at district levels.

has never been any real attempt to re-examine critically the machinery of government *as a whole*, as a means of gearing that machinery to large-scale economic and social change. Instead the tendency has been to improvise somewhat haphazardly on the basis of inherited institutions. This is evident at the centre as well as in the provinces which, as suggested above, are perhaps too large for the effective promotion and supervision of development. It is much more obvious at district level where, as we shall see, the administrative officer has responsibility for the good government of his area but has lost the substance of power to representatives of the ruling party.

# Development in Africa
# The Problems of Today*

By Sir ANDREW COHEN

*The late Sir Andrew Cohen was Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Overseas Development*

WHEN we open our newspapers we see more often than not nowadays gloomy news about Africa. Most gloomy of all is the news which comes out of Southern Africa; but I am not so much concerned with that today. We also get news about gloomy events further north, news of fighting, of tribal disturbances, even of broken diplomatic relations with Britain. I quite often meet people who say in face of this situation "Why do we give massive aid to African countries?" Nearly a third of our whole aid effort - £65 million in 1966 - goes to the African countries.

"Is this necessary?" they say. "Is it a British interest that we should continue to do this?"

This question gets asked not only by those who are hostile to aid, but by the uncommitted. What is the answer?

When these things are said to me I answer quite emphatically that it *is* right to continue to give aid on this scale, and that it is likely to go on being right to do so for a very considerable number of years ahead. I believe that it is in our interest as a member of the world community and as a trading nation to see stability and progress in Africa, and we shall not see this if we cut down or cut off our aid. I believe also that we are far more likely to make an effective contribution if we recognise that our aid commitment to the African countries we deal with is a long-term commitment and if we plan accordingly.

Before I go into detail on what we are doing and why, I have two general points to make.

First we must remember, when this or that happening in Africa depresses us, that the difficulties these countries now face, and some of the weaknesses they suffer from, stem from the state of affairs we ourselves left behind in Africa. For two or three generations we and others had power in these countries, and for most of that period absolute power. We did much during that time, but few people would dispute that we did not make enough public investment in these countries and did not do it early enough. Few would dispute that we did not train Africans for the higher responsibilities in Government early enough; we did more than some others, but not quickly enough. With some exceptions, we did not succeed in developing the efficiency of peasant agriculture. We left many of these countries with irrational frontiers. Such frontiers are not of course unique to Africa, nor can the blame be put wholly on us. British rule in Africa built up countries

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from collections of tribes, sometimes very small tribes. Nevertheless the map of Africa is not exactly a success story for colonial rule. I don't want to overwork this point. All I am saying is that these countries, struggling to match political independence with economic progress and to stand up as modern states in a world where states are expected to do more and more difficult and complicated things, are most of them very near in history to the stage when we were responsible for them. We cannot stand aside and criticise them as if we had had nothing to do with their evolution.

Secondly, we must look at the African countries in a balanced way. We read in the papers of things that go wrong. Inevitably we hear less of the success stories which tend to be less dramatic. May I take one example, that of Kenya. Her real increase in GNP since 1960 has been at the high average of 5.4 per cent per year. Over the last five years government revenue from domestic sources has been rising at 8.5 per cent and gross fixed private and public investment has been rising at 5.3 per cent per year. Last year the Kenya Government raised £7.5 million new stock on the local market in Nairobi and the Tanzanian Government raised £6 million on the same market - something quite remarkable in the conditions of developing countries. These are indeed solid achievements, and Kenya is only one example. Let us, I beg, not allow growing pains to obscure genuine progress. Many African countries are moving forward, and doing so in the right way.

One thing that we hear little about - and it is something on which I as a civil servant can legitimately speak - is the work being carried forward in a number of African countries by able, devoted and intelligent African civil servants who have emerged to take responsibility and have had in some cases to take it in exceedingly difficult circumstances. These people are propelled into positions of authority at a very early age. They have to meet great strains and stresses in countries with problems which must seem almost intractable to the boldest. And they have to work at a pressure which many of us would find extremely exacting. We should pay all respect to what they are doing.

## Obstacles to Development

Given that our accepted goal is to help African countries, what are the obstacles that stand in the way of their development? More particularly what are the ones that are most likely to yield to outside help?

First I would put the shortage of trained and educated manpower whether in the public service or elsewhere.

Second, the lack of industrial and commercial know-how and of local entrepreneurs.

Third, I would put such inherent weaknesses as inadequate basic utilities, roads, ports, power and water supplies and low agricultural productivity.

Fourth, the lack of knowledge of what could be done with the resources of the continent.

Finally, the lack of expert machinery for economic planning and of staff to man it.

Obviously conditions vary widely. Some countries are much better off than others. What I propose to do is to describe how we are helping with some of these problems, and then to make a brief assessment of the task as a

whole - whether we are on the right track and what are the basic principles we should follow.

**Education**

I put education first. It lies at the root of all development. Consider a country like Zambia today. That country now employs 2,600 graduates - but of these less than 200 are Zambians. Zambia is making great and successful efforts to expand her educational system, but needs, and is getting, much help from us in doing so. One would like to see more about this kind of development in our newspapers.

First then, help to *the universities*. We have helped build universities all over Africa. Some are already institutions of great and lasting significance and we can be proud of them. But what should they teach? More and more teaching is being shaped to meet the urgent needs of development, and anyone who does not accept that is a fuddy-duddy!

Some universities we are helping are breaking new ground by developing within a single comprehensive organization degree and diploma courses, research and extra-mural work, all related to local manpower and economic needs. The University of Malawi, for example, will include an agricultural college, a polytechnic and a college of education. Let it not be said that we have not brought our ideas about education up to date. With the help of British universities, through the Inter University Council, working links have been established between university departments and medical schools here and overseas. Some sixty such arrangements have been made, most of them in Africa. The most comprehensive are perhaps those between Glasgow and Nairobi, in medicine and veterinary science. Comparable and equally important to the work is our help at the technical level through the Council on Technical Education and Training for Overseas Countries (TETOC). Development everywhere is hampered by lack of middle level personnel. This is a field where much more needs to be done, both by African countries themselves and by those who try to help them.

After the universities and technical colleges, *the schools*. There is a continuing and very large demand for British teachers at secondary school level. In four years we have quadrupled the numbers sent overseas and in Africa alone at the end of 1966 there were 3,000 teachers and other educational staff financed by British public funds.

Even more important is the development of the teaching profession in Africa itself. There are 240 Africans in Britain this year under the Commonwealth Teacher Training Scheme and in the long vacation this summer our teachers went to Africa to assist in courses attended by 2,400 African teachers from thirteen countries. We are laying stress on helping to build up local teacher training colleges. At Kenyatta College, in Kenya, for which we have provided the buildings and a third of the staff, 250 teachers a year are being turned out at junior-secondary level.

We can help too in *educational planning*. The Ministry's own highly skilled team of educational advisers, under the leadership of our doyen, Sir Christopher Cox, are in constant demand, while educational television, visual aids and the study of school curricula are promoted by special institutions in London dealing with each of these matters. These we help financially. We have played our part in bringing new ideas forward in the

field of education and rural development in the true spirit of Professor Dumont.

A special word is due on the good work of the British Council, whose work in developing countries is now supported directly by the Ministry. In the teaching of English and science, and in library development, among many other things, the Council's work is of first-class importance and highly appreciated.

From formal education I turn to the pressing matter of helping *to train professional and technical staff to fill posts* in the developing countries. We have helped to establish an Administrative Staff College in East Africa and may be able to help in the same way in Ghana. We have conducted middle executive civil service training for the Civil Service in Tanzania and Zambia and provided specialist training staff for Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. We are hoping to develop teams of trainers to meet other particular situations.

Nearly two thousand people from Africa came for study and training in this country in 1966 alone helped by Ministry grants; a fifth of these were in public administration. Post-graduate training is the main aim, but we provide practical training too; to take one or two examples, courses in educational administration, in government legal work, in accountancy - most important - and training techniques.

The African governments still hold large numbers of *staff from overseas* to fill specialist posts and supplement their local services. Under the Overseas Service Aid Scheme (OSAS), over 9,000 British men and women are serving African governments. The Ministry recruits and meets the extra cost to these governments of employing these people. A thousand more are being supported under a new scheme, British Expatriate Supplementation Scheme (BESS), which enables us to supplement the salaries of British staff in universities, public corporations, etc. These schemes are characteristic of British aid. They have played an indispensable part in Africa's transition. Now we are thoroughly reviewing their methods and objectives. With some necessary changes they will, I'm certain, continue to make a vital contribution.

The demand for British staff does not diminish. Over 2,000 people are recruited a year by ODM alone, 70 per cent of them for Africa. This is one of our best success stories. Last year, if we include those recruited for official schemes by the agencies associated with the Ministry and the British volunteers, over 5,000 men and women actually went abroad. Who are they? I have mentioned the teachers - an average of 1,000 a year recruited by ODM. We also recruited 500 engineers last year; as well as doctors, nurses, geologists, architects, planners and economists - all the professions you can name are sought at one time or another.

Finding these people is a major task. We depend on and acknowledge the help and goodwill of many private and professional bodies. We advertise. We send teams to the universities. We do what we can to interest young people in future service. We or the employing governments cannot normally offer long-term career prospects, only contracts which we like to see people renew. Accordingly, we have sought with some success to make service of this sort worth while to good people.

We have made arrangements with a number of organizations enabling them to relase staff for overseas assignments. To take just one example,

twenty-one technical assistance lectureships have been established at the three schools of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine in Britain for qualified men to undertake training and advisory work overseas. Men from this pool have already gone to Dar es Salaam, Ibadan, Makerere, Ghana and Kenya. We are establishing our own Corps of Specialists whom we can send anywhere. Fifty appointments have so far been made and many more will be made. We have arranged for much larger numbers of posts to be established for overseas service in other government departments and outside government. We send nearly a hundred new graduates a year to take their teacher's diplomas in African universities; and about thirty new graduates to go overseas for post-graduate training in tropical agriculture and animal husbandry. This not only meets an immediate demand, but also adds to the stock of qualified and experienced people that a hungry world is going to need for the rest of this century and beyond. It is also immensely exciting in a society like ours, where young people have to face boredom and lack of challenge, that they should have the chance of helping as equals and friends in the making of new countries.

**Commercial and Influential Know-how**

Helping the African countries to fill the gaps in industrial and commercial know-how is another key problem. It is, to a large extent, a task for British private enterprise, we all know how much British firms such as the United Africa Company, Shell and many others have achieved. The task is not without difficulties for them at present and we all hope they will persist, as they have a vital role to play. We would like to do more in promoting partnerships for development between British firms and local organizations. One such scheme is the proposal for us to provide £500,000 to the Ethiopian Government for the Tendaho cotton project operated by a local subsidiary of the British firm of Mitchell Cotts. Our loan, which would go towards the purchase of British machinery for extending this project, would be on-lent by the Ethiopian Government to this company. This is a promising form of co-operation which we would like to see adopted in other countries.

One of our most effective means of help in this field is through the *Commonwealth Development Corporation.* The Corporation is flexible and can operate either on its own or in partnership with British private companies or with state owned agencies or with private companies in the country where it works. It lends money for public utilities and housing; it invests directly, or indirectly through development corporations, in industry.

In particular, the CDC manages agricultural schemes, in many of which smallholders are linked under a single management with large plantations or farms, thus bringing up-to-date techniques in tropical agriculture within the reach of small farmers, and in some cases without plantations - simply on a smallholder basis. I have just visited one highly successful scheme now operating in Kenya of partnership between smallholders, the Corporation, the World Bank and private companies, which operate the processing and marketing side. There can be few better success stories anywhere in the world, in any field of activity. The Kenya Tea Development Authority smallholder programme is producing the best quality tea in Kenya - indeed I am told the best anywhere in the world. In a word, the CDC combines investment with good management and training. It is perhaps the most

efficient aid-giving organization we have - although, Mr. Chairman, I don't think you like calling it an aid-giving organization. More power to its arm and, if I have anything to do with this, more juice to its engines.

**Improvement of basic utilities and agricultural productivity**

A good deal of our capital aid programme is devoted to this, but I must be brief. Examples are the improvement of the vital Mombasa-Nairobi road link; the development of the road system in Uganda, which was preceded by a road survey which we also assisted; the Niger dam and hydro-electric project in Nigeria, to which we have contributed as one of a group of countries; and on a smaller scale help for water development essential for the livestock industry in Niger and Chad.

Then there is the problem of *agricultural productivity;* of better cropping and better livestock; of getting through to peasant farmers with new ideas. We concentrate special efforts on helping in this field. At the end of last year over 1,000 agricultural specialists from Britain were in Africa on schemes we support; by a very special effort we had recruited nearly 200 during the year.

In Uganda we are helping to expand tobacco farming. In Kenya we are giving large-scale support to the government, through money and expert advice, in land settlement for Africans and the consolidation of African land holdings.

Recently we sent 300 pedigree cattle to breed up more productive dairy cattle in Uganda. We and the Danes are now being asked for more. We have financed a Fisheries Training Institute at Entebbe in Uganda where by 1971 with improved measures fish landings could be increased by 25 per cent. Timber and timber products are being developed in Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania and Sierra Leone with the help of equipment and experts from Britain.

**Scientific aids to Productivity**

To improve her agricultural productivity and to exploit her natural resources, Africa needs science. It is not enough to improve the elementary tools, a better hoe or a better plough, although this is in itself of first-class importance, and I commend the work of the Intermediate Technology Group in this regard.

African countries must gain greater knowledge and control of the physical environment. We help here through the Directorate of Overseas Surveys, with mapping on a very large scale and the training of surveyors. Soil, mineral and water resource surveys are all helped by our experts.

After surveys comes research and its application. The production of better crops and livestock, improved tree breeding; the elimination of pests in storage and of plant diseases in crops like cotton and maize. All this work, which is producing great changes, and the tremendous advance in tropical medicine, is helped forward by the home-based institutions run by the Ministry and by other institutions which we support financially.

The scientific services Britain operated in the colonial period did first-class work; but inevitably, with independence, methods have had to change. In East Africa we continue to bear half the cost of the inter-territorial research bodies and largely to service them with British staff. But we have been

pressing the international organizations to move more fully into this field. Progress is slow, but the U.N. Development Programme is supporting fisheries work in Uganda. National agencies from other countries are also giving aid. Japanese doctors are working in Tanzania. Holland is providing the Director for the East African Institute of Malaria, and the Rockefeller Foundation the Director of the East African Agricultural and Forestry Research Institute outside Nairobi, along with many other forms of help to the East African countries.

The Ministry's own home-based scientific and technological institutions work closely with and for the international agencies, and we hope to develop from them teams of experts to deal with special problems in the field.

**Economic Planning**

This brings me to the last of the key problems I identified earlier. Planning and administration of economic and financial policy are essential to effective development, the proper use of resources and the effective use of aid. Nor can developing countries easily secure aid nowadays unless they can show the aid giving organizations that their development is being properly planned. We have done our best to help in this sector, and our Economic Planning Staff, formerly under Dudley Seers and now under Bryan Hopkin, has achieved very great results. In some cases we have provided, on request, economic planners and administrators for periods of months or longer. We have helped both Malawi and Uganda in this way. In other cases we have provided people for shorter visits to help at critical stages of the planning or implementation process. Sometimes we have sent teams of experts to survey a country's economy and make a report, reviewing development prospects and advising on the lines of investment and other kinds of action which ought to be taken to make the best of the development potential. This sort of co-operative review is especially valuable in the case of countries receiving budgetary assistance from Britain. The budgetary needs of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Gambia and Malawi have received close attention from Ministry of Overseas Development economic missions over the past two years.

**Promoting Public Involvement**

Before I come to my conclusions I should mention a group of problems which can only be solved from inside these countries, but where we can give at least some help towards solutions.

Part of the process of development is the growth of effective voluntary societies, councils of social service, women's organizations, professional associations, population councils, which are gaining increasing importance in Africa, and so on. These diversify the public life of a country and reduce its monolithic character. They act as pressure groups for particular fields of activity; they raise standards of professional practice; they produce new ideas. They are much needed in all these countries. We have the co-operation of the voluntary organizations and professional societies in Britain with their long traditions and I welcome the help they have always been prepared to give and the immense trouble they have taken to make this help effective. I give two examples of what we are doing. We have sent a woman adviser to Kenya to help organize the many voluntary bodies which the vigorous

women's movement in that country has brought to life, and she is doing a first-class job. Secondly, the Kenya Government asked us to appoint an adviser to help in framing policy for a National Youth Service to take in 5,000 young men a year. We have in fact made available a leader and seven training officers. The young men are engaged in road building schemes, afforestation and the development of the national parks which are the mainstay of Kenya's valuable tourist industry.

**Conclusions**

I have given a long catalogue of the key problems and what we are doing about them. I could have spoken at even greater length; because the projects I have mentioned are only examples of the many and varied things we are doing.

Can we now take a view of the wood, after this vast array of trees?

I start with a word about co-operation with other aid organizations, national and international. Are we avoiding costly duplication of effort?

Yes, there is co-ordination and it is growing. But it is only in its early stages and must be carried much further. It takes much staff and time, but there has been progress in the last five years particularly. We have welcomed this because there has been a tendency to regard aid to Commonwealth Africa as a peculiarly British responsibility - and in some cases we remain as virtually the only aid givers.

We have very close contact with our opposite numbers in European countries and with the US Agency for International Development. In East Africa the Scandinavians are increasingly active: we warmly welcome their presence and are establishing close co-operation with them.

The International Bank is playing a larger and larger part in the process of co-ordination. Its work in education and agriculture is a relatively new departure which we particularly appreciate. We are co-operating in the consultative groups which it is running for several African countries, and also with the group established by the International Monetary Fund for Ghana. We have helped the UN Economic Commission for Africa in specialized studies by consultants. We have promised financial and technical help to the African Development Bank.

In higher education in Africa we have worked closely with American and British foundations, the US AID, and more recently the Canadian External Aid Office, and with universities in the three countries. This has been a very fruitful association. I have just come back from a most valuable conference called by the University of East Africa at which all these organizations and others from West Germany, Holland and Scandinavia were able to discuss the plans for the university's development with government and university representatives from all the East African countries. It was a resounding success.

But what about our own aid? Are we seeing that the aid we give is well adapted to the needs of the African countries, is designed to secure that they respond by making good use of it, and is efficiently managed at our end? I believe that we are. Like most other aid donors we are still relatively neophytes in this new human activity. We must constantly improve what we are doing and avoid complacency. We must respond to the spur of our friendly critics. What are the essential points?

The first need is to proceed by joint and continuous study and consultation with the governments of the African countries. This goes on all the time and I have given examples. It requires staff, and staff with the necessary qualifications, to deal with aid business at British diplomatic posts. I should like to take the opportunity of thanking the Diplomatic Service Administration Office for the help they have given us by strengthening British posts overseas to deal with this work.

Secondly, aid must not be given haphazard, but in accordance with well thought-out development plans based on a right indication of the priorities and identification of the key problems. For this purpose the necessary consultation must be reinforced on our side with expert knowledge, and knowledge in some depth, of the characteristics and development needs of the countries we are dealing with.

Such knowledge is secured through frequent visits both ways; by discussions and exchanges of information. Our desk officers, our economic planners, our specialist advisers all participate in this.

Thirdly, we must make sure that British resources of manpower, expert advice, training facilities, etc., are readily available, so that they can be deployed as they are needed in our aid programmes to particular countries. Contracts within this country account for much of the Ministry's daily work. We cannot achieve what we are aiming at except by working closely and continuously with British universities, technical colleges, research institutions, trade unions, the co-operative movement, professional associations, voluntary societies, etc. Aid and technical assistance are not just something that governments can do on their own. The resources of Britain as a whole must be engaged. The task is a highly complex one and depends for its success not only on the work of the Ministry itself, but also on that of large numbers of busy people in all the organizations I have mentioned and many others.

Fourthly, we must manage our aid effectively. We take this most seriously in the Ministry. Following a complete internal study of aid management we are now bringing into force measures which will secure a more systematic analysis of projects we are considering for assistance, closer management of the aid and technical assistance we give, and in due course evaluation of the results we achieve. We shall rely largely for this on the help of posts overseas and they generally welcome what we are proposing to do.

Fifthly, our aid operations should be designed to promote and encourage self help in the countries we deal with. We do not aim to do things on our own, but to help the African countries to build up their government services as well as other institutions such as universities, development corporations, voluntary societies, and so on. It is here that links with the corresponding bodies in this country - links on a long-term basis - are so valuable. It is a major part of our policy to encourage these. We have made much progress in the university and research fields and would like to see more links developed in other fields as well.

Finally, I would like to emphasize again the importance of continuity. Aid, if it is to be of any use, cannot be turned on and off like a tap. One cannot plan just for a year ahead. We should enter into commitments for three or four years ahead, as we have done in the case of Botswana, Lesotho, Gambia, Malawi, Kenya and Uganda. We shall achieve more and do more

good to the African countries and ourselves if we recognize that our help is going to be needed, and is likely to be asked for, for a number of years ahead. The nature of the task and the needs of the African countries as we see them both point inevitably to this conclusion. We have a long haul. We should organize ourselves for this as we have been trying to do. If as a country we accept this, as I believe most of the African countries do, then we have every chance of moulding our rich experience, our long and close contacts with the African countries, our skills, our resources, the enthusiasm of our young people - perhaps our greatest asset of all - into an instrument which can play a major part in helping to bring the long-drawn-out transition in Africa to a successful conclusion. If that can be achieved, then we shall have helped to increase world stability both to our own advantage and that of the African countries themselves.

# Rural Development in Baluchistan: The Works Programme and Ground Water Supplies

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## Background, Prospects, Problems

SINCE July, 1963, interesting and significant progress has been made in the Quetta Division of Pakistan[1] in developing ground water for irrigation purposes. If the contribution of the programme to Pakistan's national development is only marginal its direct impact upon the economy of Baluchistan itself is considerable, and its indirect results may be of even greater consequence. The basic idea of the Quetta project is potentially applicable to much of the whole region and in the long run, continuing development of water resources may do more than arrest the current flow of labour away from Baluchistan: it may attract immigration and investment from densely populated and richer areas of the country. The programme provides at least a partial solution to the centuries old problem of nomadism, of the numerous and colourful wandering tribes of the area for whom the national boundaries of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan are but a scant regarded curiosity and whose cattle annually depredate Pakistan's slender grazing resources. The concern of this paper, however, is less with the actual or potential economic significance of the ground water development programme than with the manner of its execution. Its purpose is to analyse a feat of social engineering which, in even so historically unsettled and poverty-stricken an area, is achieving notable success in bridging a great gap in communication and confidence between government and people as a result of which *through the efforts of the people themselves* the benefits of modern technology are being brought to bear on one of the most unfavourable agricultural situations in the world.

For the background of the programme it is necessary to turn briefly to the topography and history of the area.

Baluchistan is one of the most barren places on earth. It consists of a series of huge stony deserts with, for much of it, the highest evaporation rate known where open surface water can lose six feet a year through atmospheric loss alone. In such an area the struggle for water is the struggle for life; its scarcity accounts for the low population density which in Kalat division is nine, and in Quetta division twelve to the square mile, as compared with nine hundred in the well-watered Punjab. In such an area poverty breeds poverty. The money does not exist to invest in wells or in Persian wheels[2] and the camels to drive them: trees, wild plants and even roots

[1] Quetta and Kalat administrative divisions compose that part of Baluchistan which belongs to Pakistan: the region is bounded on the West by Persia, on the North West by Afghanistan, and on the South by the Arabian Sea.

[2] An animal driven rotating water wheel geared to operate a vertical bucket chain for lifting water from a well. The system is of great antiquity dating probably from the Persian Empire of nearly 1000 B.C.

are used for fuel: in time, as a result of deforestation and over-grazing, land dries out and, in the absence of the protection which trees alone can afford, is subject to serious wind erosion and loss of top soil. Thus nomadism in the 135,000 square miles of Baluchistan is the way of life of the vast majority of its people.

Though, territorially, Baluchistan comprises almost one third of Pakistan it has less than one per cent of its inhabitants. In the early post-war years Pakistan became increasingly concerned with the size and rapid rate of growth of its population and the challenge it presented both to agriculture and industry to avert widespread famine before the end of the century. Though Baluchistan's potential, in the absence of perennial rivers and with its unfavourable topography, was not comparable with that of other parts of the country - and particularly the Indus Basin - as areas of economic investment, it nevertheless acquired, over and above its strategic importance, some significance as an area of untapped natural resources whose development was a matter of not only local but national consequence. The first five-year plan stated that, "the first requirements are a comprehensive survey of the water resources, topography, soils, land, and the economic needs to be served by water and power resources development, and a logical and consistent general plan for the purpose" and allocated as a beginning three million rupees to this end.[3]

With this financial support the Geophysical Institute at Quetta (established with UNESCO assistance in 1951) was able to expand and intensify research and, before the end of the fifties, to make important additions to the knowledge of Baluchistan's potential. It identified and illuminated three main aspects of the problem. First, it established the existence in large quantities of untapped ground (or sub-surface) water.[4] Second, it demonstrated that acquafers of easily workable depth (up to a hundred feet) could be located accurately, cheaply and quickly. Third, it proved the investment advantages over other approaches to the problem of making cheap power available and providing small pumping sets for bringing the water to the surface. One successful pump-operated project might produce an annual net income of more than half a lakh[5] of rupees - in one year repaying more than the initial capital outlay. Thus at first sight ground water development offered to the government as favourable an investment opportunity as existed in the whole spectrum of national development.

Closer examination however revealed disadvantages. The key to them lay in the essential dependence upon *small scale* as opposed to large scale enterprise, the need to spread widely rather than concentrate resources. Geographical and geological conditions made it impossible to provide one major hydraulic operation which would give the local zamindar[6] a ready-made water resource: rather the zamindars themselves would have to help to provide it. As its researches proceeded the Geophysical Research Institute came to appreciate this fact. Its annual reports towards the end of

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[3] *Pakistan's First Five Year Plan* (1955-60) p. 388 paragraph 161.

[4] "About 16,000 sq. miles (12 per cent) of Baluchistan can be cultivated and about half could be developed as range land . . . only about 1,200 sq. miles are in fact cultivated in any one year". *Annual Report of the U.N.E.S.C.O. Arid zone Geophysical Research Project in Pakistan for* 1958.

[5] Approximately £3,750, 1 lakh is 100,000.

[6] The holder of a portion of land.

the decade show that almost as rapidly as the field workers resolve their doubts about *technical* feasibility so they develop anxieties about the *human* difficulties. Increasingly they recognise that discovery of water, and new methods to develop it, could achieve little without the co-operation of the tribesmen themselves. The report of 1959 says soberly and discouragingly "any action on the basis of the survey will ask for some change in the habits and thinking of the inhabitants. Like farmers everywhere they are fiercely conservative and traditionalist. Without the people's will, change or increase in production will be impossible . . ."[7].

The root of the human problem however, as events were to show, was not that farmers were conservative about agriculture or resistant to new methods, but that custom and politics made it difficult for "advanced" ideas to get a hearing. The ruggedly independent character of a loose tribal society, fashioned over centuries of the hard struggle for existence in a cruel climate, made the problem more difficult, as did the sense of isolation of the more remote parts from the rest of the country and the limitations, even in the more settled areas, of lines of communication with the departments of central government. Certainly at the end of the fifties these factors would have posed for the planners and administrators of rural development three insuperable obstacles to rapid ground water development.

First - arising from the difficulty envisaged by the Research Institute - was the problem of changing the zamindar's passive acceptance to active support for *his* was the key role. He would have to supply labour for digging the wells (in such terrain a formidable undertaking), for constructing the surface storage tanks, and for carrying stone and sand. Such tasks, performed by zamindars through their own resources and with their knowledge of local conditions, could be achieved at a fraction of the cost to government were they to be carried out by technical departments. Without such local contribution fewer people would benefit, selection would become more invidious and public support less forthcoming. Moreover, unless people were involved from the start of a project, confidence in the government, without which the zamindar could not play his part, would be lost.

The second obstacle arose from the necessary emphasis on the individual rather than the community. For the planners this provided a challenge because it reversed the emphasis of previous programmes of rural community development in Pakistan, which were planned to benefit rural communities as a whole. For the administrator it posed more practical problems. A ground water programme called for financial and technical assistance to individual zamindars. But who was to give this and how? The very limited local experience in comparable projects had not been encouraging. So often the official controls had been harsh and unrealistic and the choice of beneficiaries by government officers unpopular.[8] To win and maintain public confidence and support a method was needed which enabled the

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[7] *U.N.E.S.C.O. Arid zone Geophysical Research Project.* Report from 1959.

[8] Under the Agricultural Department's *Taccavi* system of individual loans for farming purposes a farmer in favourable circumstances might benefit substantially, but a small farmer with little in reserve might, especially if he encountered unforeseen difficulties, suffer severely under the loan repayment scheme. This was effected in the same way as arrears in land revenue for which a man could serve a prison sentence without losing the obligation to pay. The *Taccavi* system had proved much less successful in Baluchistan than anywhere else in the country.

farmers to select one of their number for projects and to provide some form of surety for his good faith.

The third obstacle - arising from the second - was the problem which was both political and economic, of combining the interests of the individual and the community, of reducing rather than increasing disparities between the zamindars. For much of the region there was no personal taxation and the increase in wealth to successful zamindars selected under the programme would be very large in proportion to per capita incomes for the area. A device was needed to ensure that personal savings were turned into productive capital. This suggested that individual farmers should receive not grants but loans repayable over a period, with the repayments used to subsidise new projects in other homesteads. Once again this called for some form of local co-operative organization which could scarcely be said to exist in the fifties.

Factors such as these were not problems of traditional attitudes towards agriculture itself: they were problems of social organization. They underlined an institutional weakness. They suggested not that it was impossible for ideas to be exchanged but that no means existed through which a beginning could be made. In part they explain why for half a decade little was done to follow up work of the Geophysical Research project. To apply the lessons of scientific research on any significant scale demanded more than infusions of capital or strengthening departments of government. It called for a profound change in the whole area of human relations, of farmers with each other and with the public service, a change which could realize the hopes of distant national politicians when they asked for partnership between government and people, for mutual devotion of resources and skills to a common end.

## The Introduction of Basic Democracies and the Rural Works Programme

Some years, however, were to elapse before the impact of the dramatic events in the central political arena of Pakistan culminating in the revolution of 1958, was felt in remote Baluchistan. The harbinger of change when it came was the promulgation by the military government of the day, as a first step to the removal of martial law, of the Basic Democracies Order in 1959. These remarkable political institutions have been well chronicled elsewhere: for the purposes of this study it is necessary only to summarize some salient features which were to have a direct bearing upon the ground water programme.

Basic Democracies are small elected local councils of ten to fifteen members based on a primary constituency of a thousand people or less. They were designed to fill a vacuum in communication; politically, to effect a meaningful transfer of power to the people; and economically to associate them with the main stream of development. They were small enough to make representation meaningful yet large enough to form an effective link in an ascending hierarchy of councils leading up to the National Assembly and the President. Their powers – which were to grow considerably in subsequent years – included, in the rural though not in the urban areas, the right to tax and to exercise a number of development functions. Predictably, early achievement in development during the first few years of

basic democracies varied over the country with the wide disparities between regions in economic and social development, and the more spectacular progress was in the wealthier districts. In the frontier areas the most significant consequence of basic democracies was improved communication between government and people. Merely to translate the ordinance into action entailed the employment of new cadres of field officers stationed in the larger villages. Many long meetings took place in homesteads, union[9] *Tehsil* and district[10] headquarters. Training programmes were launched for chairmen and secretaries of union councils. By 1961 government officers on tour no longer visited only the local *Sirdar*[11]: they met the local basic democrats. In this way an altogether novel exchange of views on development and other matters took place between the elected representatives of the people and the field officers. If in remoter corners of the region some farmers remained obdurate and entrenched in their isolationism, over most of the area the signs of a new confidence in the government were discernible.

By 1963, in most of Pakistan, Basic Democracies had emerged as an effective and permanent link in the social and political organisation of the country. Moreover, in the economic field, some of the richer ones had demonstrated – often dramatically – ability to mobilise financial resources and carry out constructive development schemes. It was this which led government in 1963 to devote substantial funds from public sector expenditure to a programme of rural development to be carried out by the basic democracies themselves. Thus the Rural Works Programme was launched with an allocation in the case of West Pakistan of one hundred million rupees for the year 1963–64. To ensure decentralization it was laid down that three-quarters of the money spent was to be for projects planned and executed by the union council themselves: not more than a quarter could be expended by the district councils. Union council programmes were to be examined for feasibility and co-ordinated by the district council under the chairmanship of the Deputy Commissioner[12] who would arrange for the release of the money, for technical assistance where needed, and for supervision of work. To persuade as many people as possible to participate, government kept its planning restraints to a minimum: within broad limits the forty-four districts of West Pakistan were free to determine their own sectoral priorities in accordance with the needs, wishes, and capabilities of the people.

## Irrigation Development in Quetta District

It was thus that Quetta District, the most developed and populous district in Baluchistan, found itself in mid-1963 with a generous allocation from the

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9 The "union" is the lowest tier of the Basic Democracies system. In the rural area it is called a Union Council, in the urban a Union Committee, the main distinction between the two being the right of the rural union to levy taxes.

10 The two divisions of Baluchistan comprise nine administrative districts. A *Tehsil* is a sub-division of a district. In the whole region there are thirty-nine *Tehsils* and 162 union councils.

11 Honorific title for a local notable.

12 A Deputy Commissioner is a member of the central or provincial civil service in Pakistan responsible to government for a variety of functions within one district. He exercises a co-ordinating role over the technical department activities in his area and is the ex-officio chairman of the district council.

provincial total,[13] an already established nucleus of social organization (sixteen union councils had been established), much public enthusiasm for the Works Programme fostered in meetings with Basic Democracies over many months; and above all, freedom to select its own schemes and if need be to experiment. In none was this freedom more important than the irrigation sector, in which Basic Democracies were able to try out five different kinds of project. At the same time it was precisely because of the experimental nature of the programme in this sector that, in the first year, expenditure on irrigation was limited to 46 per cent of the total for the district. Though union councils placed first priority upon it, they accepted the wisdom of ensuring that more than half the money was spent on projects in which substantial experience existed and whose successful execution was thereby more assured.[14]

As a result of the planning discussions between union councils and the District Works Programme team which included the local officer of the irrigation department and an engineer specially recruited for the programme by the district council, feasibility studies were made, proposals scrutinized and sanctioned and work begun on five different kinds of project.

First, some money was devoted to lining existing *kharezes*[15] to prevent seepage and loss of water. Six were provided with concrete water storage tanks to give a head of water and allow a larger area to be irrigated. In Khair Mohammad for example, a tank with a storage capacity of 32,500 gallons was constructed (at a cost of less than 4,000 rupees) which increased the area of land under cultivation from 5 to 7.5 acres.

Second, three tubewell schemes were taken up but owing to difficulties in obtaining a drilling rig two were given up and only one completed. The district council abandoned such schemes as Works Programme projects after the first year for reasons which will appear.

Third, a few dams were constructed in areas favourable to the storing of rainwater.

Fourth, six flood protection dams were undertaken.

Fifth – and as events were to show, overwhelmingly the most important type of project – was what is now known as the open surface well. This is a huge hand excavated pit dug ten to fifteen feet below the water table –

[13] "Generous" that is, per head of population. Government divided half the total allocation of funds for the Works Programme equally between districts and the other half on a population basis. The argument was that although capability was considerably more in the areas of highest population density the decentralised programme offered a unique opportunity of directing development into the backward and under-populated regions of the country. Since the population density for the Quetta and Kalat divisions was by a long margin the lowest in the whole country their Works Programme allocations per capita were correspondingly the highest.

[14] This was a very necessary consideration in local planning: the provincial government had imposed a proviso (though unsuccessfully as later events were to show) aimed at eliminating wastage from the Works Programme, that allocations in subsequent years would depend on satisfactory performance during the first year of the programme.

[15] A *khareze* is an underground channel which carries water from a mountain source to suitably sheltered flat land in the plain or valley below. It is constructed and maintained by means of a series of vertical tunnels. For centuries the *khareze* has been an important means of irrigation over much of the C.E.N.T.O. region but it has severe limitations. It is subject to silting up and tunnel collapse: both construction and maintenance are hazardous in the extreme.

possibly to a depth of a hundred feet and more. It is ten to fourteen feet in diameter, brick lined, and has a low wall or earth-built shed at the surface. Such wells were not a new idea in Quetta District: the novelty introduced in the Works Programme was to modify them so that a diesel or electrically operated pump could be used to lift water into concrete water tanks on the surface. These were built to a standard design produced by the Works Programme engineer with a capacity of 32,500 gallons and were capable of irrigating areas (varying with local conditions) between twenty-five and fifty acres.

Long before the end of the first year's programme in the district this last type of project had found much favour with the local zamindars. To them the pump operated open-surface well had many advantages over the turbine pump tubewells favoured by the agricultural department. First, the excavation of the well could be done with local village labour. Second, stone and brick required for the lining of the walls were available locally. Third, the size of the well provided a considerable storage area and in low yield acquafers the large infiltration area increased its potential yield. Fourth, the large diameter well allowed the installation of a centrifugal pump which is considerably cheaper and needs less maintenance than the turbine pump used in tubewells. Fifth, and most important of all, open-surface wells avoided the expense of costly tube-well drilling rigs, of hiring the skilled operators they require and of setting up maintenance depots. The disadvantages were twofold: first, because excavation is done by hand open-surface wells may require as much as three months to complete; and second, if diesel, instead of electrically powered engines are used, they have a lower efficiency than turbine pumps. Such drawbacks, however, were far more than outweighted by the advantages and in the meetings at union and district level held to discuss the progress of the Works Programme the popularity and appeal of the open-surface well became rapidly and firmly established. In the early part of the year Quetta District changed its programme in favour of more open-surface wells and at the end of the year was able to report substantial progress through this medium. "Under the Works Programme, for the first time, a properly planned development of the underground water resources was made. In the first year nineteen (open surface) wells have been put in with pumping sets and a thousand acres will be irrigated by them". Water was available at depths of between 40 and 100 feet, and by using a diesel engine or an electric motor farmers were able to bring under irrigation land on which they normally grew cash crops such as potatoes, tobacco, tomatoes and other vegetables. Depending on his marketing expenses an acre of land under these crops brought in to the farmer an annual income of two to three thousand rupees. With the emphasis on open-surface wells Quetta District in the first year of the Works Programme invested all told 604,350 rupees in irrigation projects and brought an extra 1,500 acres of desert under cultivation, adding an estimated total annual additional wealth to the area of some 400,000 rupees.

**Administration and Financial Arrangements**

In the difficult conditions of Baluchistan such development would not have been possible without significant and imaginative changes in field administration. Some account of them is necessary at this juncture to show,

not only how they overcame initial difficulties in Quetta District, but also how they opened up the way for carrying the basic idea of the ground water programme to other and less favoured parts of the region.

The political decision to launch the Works Programmes had drastic consequences for public administration. Long established and cumbersome systems of central control of field programmes had to be jettisoned: the sheer size and pace of the Works Programme[16] forced a quite novel delegation of power to agencies in the field. In matters of finance district officers were freed for the first time in a rural development programme from the inhibiting obligation to seek approval for all but minor expenditure: district councils were authorized to sanction projects costing up to 50,000 rupees in place of the former limit of 2,500. Similarly in administrative matters substantial freedom was given to districts to carry out the Rural Works Programmes in their own way. Here, the advantage of the programme was its novelty: precedents for it did not exist. Though government issued new planning, accounting, and reporting procedures, worked out in training courses for field officers of the Basic Democracies department, these were guidelines not blueprints and districts were free to adopt, improve, or replace them as they chose.

Quetta District, which, let it be said, owed much to inspired leadership, used this freedom to consult the basic democrats themselves from the outset and was able to prove that it was possible to devise rules and record keeping systems which were efficient in controlling waste and corruption and could yet be understood by the people. The formula adopted for the Works Programme was straightforward. After initial consultations in the village about the programme, schemes proposed by the union councils were reviewed and consolidated by the *Tehsil* councils before being provisionally accepted by the district council. At this stage the engineering staff of the Works Programme examined the feasibility of the schemes on the site and when satisfied produced a work order in Urdu a copy of which was handed to the Project Committee[17]. Funds for the project were then released to the project committee through the union council in instalments, each release requiring a satisfactory progress report from the union council chairman. Inevitably, field officers had to give much attention to training union councils and project committees for implementing schemes but it is significant that in the second year of the programme the training problem was eased since, as the report for 1963-64 observes: "there are now a score of individuals who have been able to implement the scheme successfully and we shall be able to use their experience in training the new project committees".

The flexibility of the new style "development" administration played an important part in surmounting the kind of obstacle to local involvement in rural development described earlier in this paper. Union Councils and zamindars willingly accepted the necessary obligations and responsibilities.

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[16] In West Pakistan in the first year of the Works Programme almost 14,000 projects were completed in a little over nine months at an average cost of a little over 6,000 rupees each.

[17] This was a committee formed as soon as a scheme was provisionally accepted by the Basic Democracies. It consisted of a member of the Union Council of the ward in which the scheme was to be undertaken, a representative of the beneficiaries of the scheme, and a person of local standing in the village where the scheme was to be undertaken.

Individual beneficiaries were chosen by the Union Council (on occasion by lot). Farmers selected undertook – after the siting had been done by the Works Programme engineer and the officer of the Irrigation Department – to excavate the pit, and to provide brick linings for the whole length of the wells. The District Council then provided him with an engine and a pump and the concrete storage tank. The Zaminder with two other farmers as guarantors agreed to pay back the cost of the investment in instalments to the Union Council over a period of ten years. [18] The result of these arrangements was that in the second year of the programme (no repayment being enforced during the first) the Union Council accumulated money which could be used to subsidise new projects. In other words money invested in open-surface wells became an example of the financial system known as the "revolving fund".

It was this arrangement which made possible rapid expansion of the open-surface well programme in subsequent years. In the first year, Quetta district had limited the scheme to holders of at least twenty-five acres of land, not because a smaller land holder could not make the scheme economic, but to ensure that degree of "self-help" which the Basic Democracies could accept as a reasonable earnest of good faith. But what was "reasonable" for much of Quetta district – the wealthiest of the nine districts in Baluchistan and with a population density of fifty-four to be set against the regional average of eleven persons to the square mile – could be prohibitive in the poorer areas[19]. Once the practicability and popularity of the open-surface well was established, however, the "revolving fund" idea, based on corporate kinship group responsibility and backed by local organization, encouraged Basic Democracies to increase the subsidy and reduce the farmer's own contribution. Thus the number of farmers who "qualified" for assistance was substantially increased and in the second year of the Works Programme the open-surface well scheme was widely extended not only to the poorer farmers in Quetta but also to other districts. In consequence, out of a substantially increased allowance for 1964–65 Quetta increased the percentage devoted to irrigation from 46 per cent the year before to 70 per cent, and this proportion was very nearly equalled in two further districts, those of Zhob and Lorelei. With this expansion of the programme a further six thousand acres were brought under cultivation.

The following year, 1965–66, sombre events on the international scene culminating in the confrontation with India brought heavy cuts in development expenditure and a severe but short-lived set-back to ground water expansion. In 1966–67 grants were restored and the programme, though

[18] To support the authority of the union council the agreement with the farmer was made in three copies, one for the union council itself, a second for the *Tehsil* council and a third to be kept in the Works Programme office of the district council. This enabled a union council, in cases of default, to appeal to the sub-divisional magistrate for assistance in recovering a loan. In the limited life of the scheme, so far, little difficulty has been experienced by the basic democracies in collecting instalments. This is in marked contrast to the government's lack of success in recovering payments for tube-well schemes under an earlier project: it seems that the zamindar is more willing to honour obligations to his own local organisation than to the remote and impersonal agency of "government".

[19] A not untypical case, at Killi Abdul Hashim, shows the personal contribution of the zamindar to a scheme in which government investment amounted to 15,629 rupees to be 6,129 rupees. Such a sum was well beyond the capacity of most farmers outside Quetta.

official figures are not yet available, appears to have surpassed previous performance.

The potential of the Works Programme in Baluchistan is clear. How far it is realized depends on a variety of factors outside the scope of this paper. But already, whatever its physical achievement, the method of ground water development to-day in Quetta and other districts has significance for the Works Programme throughout the country. It has done much to convert those planners and administrators who used to believe that to overcome the natural disadvantages of poor and backward areas no alternative exists to large scale technological enterprise and that hence the inhabitants can contribute but little to their own advancement. No programme amongst those of the forty-four districts in West Pakistan in the first years of the Works Programme did more than that of Quetta to dispel this idea or to demonstrate that with skilful social engineering the people themselves can become the principal agent in the process of modernising agriculture.

# Forest Department Administration in the Sunderbans

by RICHARD W. GABLE

Richard Gable is Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Davis.

THE Sunderbans of East Pakistan are desolate, vast, forbidding, and exceedingly beautiful. A delta of immense proportions formed by the great rivers Ganges and Jumna, they consist of dense, impenetrable jungle and the water of countless rivers and *khals* which roar down to the Bay of Bengal.

This expanse of delta straddles India and Pakistan. The eastern portion in Pakistan contains 2,316 square miles. The origin of its name is in doubt. "Ban" means forest. To some the "sunder" portion comes from the name of the *Sundri* tree which covers much of the delta. To others it comes from the word meaning "sea" so that Sunderbans stands for "sea-forest". Still others insist that it is a combination of the Bengali words "sunder" meaning beautiful and "ban" for forest.

Beaches of smooth white sand edge the forest on the Bay of Bengal. Occasional meadows covered with soft, thick grass are to be found. But the general impression is one of endless forests, so thick that it is impossible to move in them. Nature assures a systematic transition from one form of plant life to another. As islands are formed first the grasses take root. As the island enlarges greater amounts of silt pile up at the edges so that the interior is always lower than the outer rim. The grasses are replaced by bushes and then by trees. Here are the *sundri*, whose wood is used in construction or for firewood, the *gewa*, which is used in making paper and matches, and always at the rivers edge the *golpatta*, a delicate, broad leaf used for the thatching on roofs.

While some ancient ruins indicate that the Sunderbans once held a resident population, today no one lives in this vast area permanently except as he serves the East Pakistan Forest Department which controls the area or as he ekes out a living, cutting timber, gathering fuel, collecting honey, or fishing. The dense forests, the rivers when in spate, tigers and reptiles all make the Sunderbans inhospitable to man.

During the cyclonic storms of late spring and the monsoons of summer the Sunderbans are so dangerous that few venture there. The rivers are swollen, angry and turbulent. The waters flood the land and the trees stand in the saline water. For respiration under these circumstances many trees have adapted themselves by sending up spike-like roots called *pneumatophores*. These may be only a few inches high at the edge of the islands, but inland, where the islands are lower, these breathing tubes are sometimes two or two-and-a-half feet tall. They are but another hazard to movement through the Sunderbans.

The Forest Department of East Pakistan is charged with the responsibility for managing the Sunderbans and exploiting their natural resources. This

article, based on a field trip in the company of an assistant district forest officer, attempts to describe briefly the administration of the Forest Department in the Sunderbans where it has sole responsibility and controls all movements in and out of the area; it is the official arm of the government there. The Sunderbans are, as is true of all areas in Pakistan, part of a district under a deputy commissioner, which is in turn in a division headed by a commissioner. But their responsibility is virtually non-existent in this area. They would be involved only rarely, in matters such as serious crime.

**Organization**

The Forest Department is a unit within the Secretariat Department of Forests, Fisheries, and Animal Husbandry, which sets major policy. The operating department within the secretariat is properly called the directorate of forests and is headed by the chief conservator. The field units of the directorate, or forest department as it is usually called, are divisions. These do not coincide with the four main divisions into which the Province of East Pakistan is divided for general administrative purposes. Under the chief conservator of forests are several conservators who are each administratively and technically responsible for several divisions each headed by a divisional forest officer (DFO). The Sunderbans constitute one such division.

The division is the working unit of the Forest Department. In the Sunderbans the DFO has an additional DFO as his deputy, and his divisional forest office is located in Khulna, forty or fifty miles above the northern edge of the forest.

Within the Sunderbans, the principal officers are forest rangers of whom there are nine each in charge of a range, besides a senior forest ranger, who is in charge of a newsprint project. Thirty deputy forest rangers work in the range stations or serve as coupe officers. About fifty foresters serve as station officers or coupe officers. Ninety forest guards patrol the Sunderbans keeping out persons who have no permission to enter the forests, protecting government property there, and performing general police duties. Approximately four hundred boatmen are in government employment transporting forest department goods and personnel.

For management purposes the Sunderbans are divided into fifty-five compartments. These compartments are under the jurisdiction of the various forest rangers and felling coupes. The forest checking stations are located around the periphery of the Sunderbans at the main ports of entry. Since all travel in the Sunderbans is by boat on the rivers and *khals* the stations are situated on the major rivers.

The various activities, such as timber-cutting or fuel-cutting, are carried on in coupes. These are working areas which have been designated each year for a particular purpose. Thus, there are timber-cutting coupes, fuel-cutting coupes, honey gathering coupes, etc. Each coupe is divided into sections, which are areas of approximately forty acres, the usual unit for allocation to entrepreneurs.

**The Forest Service**

All the officers mentioned are members of the Forest Service, itself a provincial service. Those at the level of senior forest rangers and above are

gazetted officers. As technical and not generalist officers none has yet to be appointed as Secretary within the Secretariat.

The gazetted officers of the forest service are selected by the Provincial Public Service Commission. An oral examination is conducted by an examining board consisting of representatives of the Public Service Commission, the Secretariat, and the Forest Department. A written examination has never been used. A candidate may apply for a gazetted post if he has *either* an M.Sc. in the first or second division, provided he obtained a second class B.Sc. degree in any one of the following subjects – (*or* if he has a first or second division B.Sc. with honours in one of them) – botany, zoology or chemistry.

Upon selection, the prospective gazetted (class I) officer is sent to the Pakistan Forest Institute in Peshawar. This Institute, which was set up after independence, is run by the central government although it provides training for the two provincial forest services, and it also provides training for forest rangers and conducts research. (East Pakistan also has a Forest Products Research Laboratory located in Chittagong).

The programme of instruction at the Institute lasts two years and leads to the award of a B.Sc. degree with honours in forestry from the University of Peshawar. The syllabus is comprehensive and covers such fields as: silviculture, forest mensuration, forest management, forest statistics, forest economics, engineering, surveying, soil and water conservation, wild life management, entomology, zoology, botany, geology, soil science, and forest utilization. The forest rangers get similar instructions but of more limited scope. They are awarded a diploma in forestry.

Non-gazetted personnel are recruited into class III of the forest service, and become eligible for promotion to class II. In exceptional cases promotion can be gained from class II to class I.

## Mission in the Sunderbans

The main purpose of the forest department in the Sunderbans is to:

maintain the forests for perpetuity so that there can be a sustained yield;

maintain a variety of age classes among the varieties of trees;

meet the demands of the local people for forest products and supply industry with the necessary raw material from the forest;

protect the adjoining villages from storms and give them assistance when necessary;

protect the natural flora and fauna.

## Forest Department Procedure and Operation in the Sunderbans.

### *Licensing Boats*

No person or boat is allowed to enter in the Sunderbans without the permission of the forest department. All major entry points are manned by the department and any person who enters in order to work there must have a licence for his boat. A fee is imposed on each boat according to its capacity and its licence number is painted on it. Licences must be renewed every year.

### *Timber Cutting*

The biggest operation in the Sunderbans, which produces the largest royalty for the Government of East Pakistan, is timber cutting. One year

in advance of the tree-felling a working area is laid out within which the timber cutting will take place during the following fiscal year. This is called a coupe. It is always an extensive area covering many thousands of acres. These are selected for timber cutting on a twenty-year cycle. The entire area is not levelled by the timber cutters. Only certain trees are felled, as selected by forest rangers in accordance with departmental policy.

The coupe is divided into sections (roughly in squares), each comprising about forty acres. These sections are visibly marked on the ground so that they can be readily noted by the timber cutters concerned. Within each section the exploitable trees are marked. A careful record is kept of every tree which is felled and the work of the cutters is always closely checked. It takes at least four months to prepare a coupe for cutting, i.e., laying out the sections and marking the trees to be felled. Coupe officers set up an office in the working area and live there, with their families, during the entire period the coupe is being worked. They oversee the cutting, make certain that only the exploitable trees have been felled, collect the royalties due, and generally keep watch on all forest department interests.

The exploitable timber in a coupe is sold by auction in section lots. These sales take place in Khulna at times notified after a coupe has been laid out. Because this is the main livelihood for many in the Khulna Division, the competition to buy is keen. There is never a lack of bidders and those wanting to buy lots always far exceed the number of sections being put up. The only chance for unsuccessful bidders comes if anyone who has bought a section loses his lot for example by not keeping up his payments or by felling unmarked trees.

The purchasers of sections (lot purchasers) must, of course, have a boat licence to enter the area. They are allowed to work a section as long as they pay the regular instalments due on the section. If a payment is missed, the contractor must stop working the area until it is paid. In addition, he must make an additional penalty payment before he can resume work. Any concessionary who falls so far behind in his payments that eventually he fails to make the full payment, is only permitted to extract the proportion of the timber in his section for which he has actually paid.

As soon as the contractor has a boat load he gets a coupe-leaving certificate from the coupe officer. At this stage the coupe officer checks on the timber felled and that all regulations of the forest department have been observed. This permit allows the contractor to leave the area and his boat is checked out of the Sunderbans at the forest station at his exit point. A careful record is kept of time in and time out. If more than the designated time has been spent in the Sunderbans, the contractor may be subject to investigation. His leaving permit is the contractor's evidence that he has complied with the law and he carries it with him for this purpose.

Generally, it takes a year or more to work one section. If the contractor is very fast and efficient, he may finish a section in less time and thus be ready to bid for a new lot. His income is dependent on how much timber he can cut in a given time. It is generally reckoned that a timber cutter can make 100 per cent profit on the cost of his operations. His principle expense is the payment to the forest department for the privilege of cutting in the section, but in addition he has such costs as boat licences, maintenance of

boats, wages, living expenses, etc. A timber cutter might make as much as Rs. 10,000 in a twelve-month period.

It should be noted that the royalty paid to the forest department for timber cutting is different from that paid for the other operations described later. In the case of timber cutting the total amount paid for working a section is determined by an auction. Thereafter, the payments made to range officers at headquarters are instalments on this price. In the case of fuel cutting and *golpatta* cutting, royalties are paid to the coupe officer each time a contractor is permitted to work in the forest. Fishing royalties are paid each time a fisherman leaves the Sunderbans and are based on the quantity of fish exported. Entrance fees for fishing are also charged according to the number of men in a party and the duration of their stay in the Sunderbans.

*Fuel Cutting*

The material removed for fuel is low grade timber which cannot be used for commercial purposes or the smaller pieces removed after a timber cutting operation is over so that the section can be suitably clean, ready for regeneration.

The fuel cutter must have a licensed boat. When he enters the Sunderbans he reports to a coupe officer who allocates a specific area in which fuel may be cut. As for timber felling, so for fuel collectors there are always more applicants than vacant areas available and so, while a fuel cutter may obtain enough fuel to load his boat, take it out, and sell it in a week or two, he will probably then have to wait a number of weeks, or even months, before he can get permission to cut again. The boats line up at the coupe headquarters in great numbers as the cutters wait their chance for a concession area.

Upon obtaining a permit the fuel cutter goes to his designated area, cuts his fuel, which operation is checked by forest rangers, and then returns to coupe headquarters. Here he pays a royalty for the amount of fuel cut, which is calculated according to the capacity of his boat. He produces his cutting permit and, if the coupe officer finds no infringements, he is given a coupe leaving certificate by an appropriate endorsement on his permit; this allows the boatman to sail to the forest station where he surrenders his permit and obtains a forest leaving certificate from the station officer.

Fuel cutters can also make about 100 per cent profit on their cost of operations. However, their average net income is only about Rs. 2,000 a year.

*Honey Collection*

The honey gatherers collect beeswax and a honey which is regarded as some of the best in the world. It is plentiful in the Sunderbans and is there for the taking, if the gatherer pays the royalties of the Forest Department and the tigers do not deter him.

A permit is issued at the forest station as a honey gatherer enters the Sunderbans. The royalty is calculated according to the capacity of the containers the honey gatherer has with him. He is then permitted to gather honey anywhere in the Sunderbans within the time period he has been allowed by the permit. As the gatherer leaves the Sunderbans the amount of

honey collected is checked and he pays additional royalty if he has more than the quantity for which he paid in advance on the way in; a forest leaving permit is then issued.

*Hunting*

Hunting is also supervised. The open season for cheetal, the spotted deer, is from April 1 to September 30. A permit is issued upon the payment of a fee.

The tiger can usually be hunted without the payment of a fee, but a permit to hunt is required. Tiger hunting is permitted anywhere, and is encouraged where tigers have proved to be a menace – with a bounty sometimes being paid on the tiger skin being produced as proof of killing.

## Police/Judicial Functions of the Forest Department

As already mentioned, the jurisdiction of the deputy commissioner extends into the Sunderbans in cases of major crime. However, the forest department officers deal with all cases concerned with the breach of forest department regulations.

All gazetted forest officers can issue search warrants and take evidence. Any forest officer down to a forest guard can arrest persons within the jurisdiction of the forest department. They can release such persons on bail or pass them into police custody.

Forest department officers can impose penalties (rupees 50/– or one month in jail in addition to the value of the produce taken or damage caused) if the accused admits his guilt and is willing to compound a forest case. If he does not admit his guilt, the case must be turned over to a regular magistrate for trial. When an offence has been committed the guilty party's boat is seized and he must pay a fee to get it back.

# Definition and Typology of Land Reform

**A note contributed by PROFESSOR EDMUNDO FLORES of the University of Mexico.**

Land reform is a redistribution measure. It belongs to the same family of economic tools as fiscal and monetary policies, subsidies, rationing, tariffs, nationalisation, etc. A few years ago I was reading Richard A. Musgrave's excellent book *The Theory of Public Finance* and suddenly it struck me that Musgrave was describing the role and essence of land reform while talking about public finance. When I told him this he was very pleased and agreed, though I am not certain that he understood me.

Land reform is a redistributive measure that has two main goals: (i) to improve income distribution, (ii) to improve the allocative efficiency of land. The first goal is attained by shifting the prevailing ownership of land. Here the effects are similar to those of progressive income taxation provided that land reform is massive (i.e. accomplished in a period of 5 to 10 years) and that payment for the land is below its normal market price. The second goal is achieved by manipulating the existing pattern of land tenure by trial and error in search of optimizing the inputs of land required to form each individual farm holding, relative to the other factors of production.

Now, and this is critical, the importance given to each one of these two objectives varies according to the particular setting where land reform is tried. Degrees of development are of course critical, as well as the condition of the balance of payments and the technological expertise available in the country in question.

Variations in these critical factors allow the possibility of a tentative typology which consists of three main categories: (i) land reform in advanced countries, (ii) land reform in under-developed countries with minor or no balance of payments problems and substantial foreign exchange receipts, and (iii) land reform in underdeveloped countries with critical balance of payments problems.

The first case is typified by Italy and Japan. Here the redistributive aim could be achieved merely by shifting savings from the advanced sector of the economy to the regions in need of reform. The quest for allocative efficiency could be achieved with local capital and technicians. No confiscatory measures were essential though they occurred in Japan. The Italian reform was expensive but Italy could afford it. Production increased in the reformed regions.

The second case is represented by Venezuela and Kuwait, in one instance, and South Korea and Taiwan in another. In both cases the emphasis was on improved allocative efficiency. The reforms were expensive but the cost could be afforded. Output and yields have increased.

The third case is represented by Mexico, Cuba and Bolivia. The three reforms were confiscatory simply because the countries were bankrupt. The main aim was redistributive: the results positive in the long run. The greater part of Latin America belongs to this group.

# Quarterly Notes

**BRITAIN**—*Comment on the* 1968 *Cambridge Conference on Development*

From D. S. THORNTON.

Dr. Thornton is in the Department of Agricultural Economics at the University of Reading.

*Objectives* The objectives were defined as follows:

"to exchange ideas and experience on this subject of 'The Rural Base for National Development' and to record opinions and propositions which emerge and which will be of practical use to all agencies and countries concerned with rural development."

*Procedure* These objectives were pursued by means of

(a) Papers prepared in advance of the Conference

(b) Study Group discussion of material contained in and arising from the papers.

(c) Plenary discussion of propositions arising from the work of the study groups.

*Retrospective Comment*

(i) The location and conduct of the ten days of conference provided an excellent opportunity for both formal and informal exchange of ideas and experience (the first objective). Not a little of the success here was due to the hospitality of the hosts and to the mood of friendly combativeness inspired by the chairman.

(ii) Most of the papers and a large part of the discussion were set at a rather general level. The resulting propositions were therefore necessarily very general. On the whole the propositions relevant to Heads IV and V led to more fundamental argument than Heads I and III.

(iii) Some topics received rather more detailed treatment than others. Thus Education and Research were widely considered, the institutions and processes of planning rather little.

(iv) Insofar as one learns most from active participation in discussion the time spent in study groups was probably the most valuable of the organised activities.

(v) It would be difficult to pinpoint the degree to which the Conference had been of "practical use"; it is unlikely that the general propositions which emerged could conceivably form the basis of specific policies. Nevertheless the proceedings had a general educative value and the contacts made informally will no doubt be of great practical value in many instances in the future.

*Suggestions for future occasions*

(i) Home based administrators and academics and visitors from Africa tended to dominate the conference to the exclusion of representatives from the Middle East, Asia and Latin America. It is to be hoped that in future

the balance can be redressed. Contributions from recently successful developing countries are particularly valuable on such an occasion.

(ii) Part of such a conference might well be devoted to detailed discussion of case studies. For instance, with good prior documentation, one day might have been spent by study groups, each devoted to one country and its problems the results written up and made available for conference members to *read*.

## From JOHN MICHUKI

Mr. Michuki is Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, Nairobi, Kenya.

The "Cambridge Conference on Development" has become, over the years, an annual event, and in conformity with this "tradition" the 1968 Conference was held in Jesus College, Cambridge, during the last week of March and the first week of April. It goes without saying that the valuable experience and benefits gained from the Conference every year have emphasized the need for yet another Conference, and it is for this major reason that the 1968 meeting was convened to discuss, more specifically, the "Rural Base for National Development". Whatever the subject for discussion might be, the object of these Conferences has been to provide a forum at which ideas and experience may be exchanged both within and outside the Conferences.

It is not, in my opinion, always easy in a busy world to gather together from various countries, very distant from each other, senior people in governments, commerce, universities and other institutions, and it seems to me that the fact that this is a reality in so far as the 1968 Conference goes can be regarded as one of its main achievements.

I have been impressed by the diversity of views expressed by various participants, but I cannot help noting that the desire of everyone to harmonize these varying views has been, throughout the period of the Conference, more than evident. Experience and ideas have not only been exchanged, but also, to a large extent, merged ready to be tried on the ground by those concerned.

## From H. MOTAMEN

Mr. Motamen is Head of the Economic Bureau of the Plan Organistaion, Iran.

My first introduction to the Conference began when on the morning of 25th March, I went to the dining-hall in Jesus College for breakfast. I had to sit in a row next to another member whom I was meeting for the first time. Such an informal arrangement breaks after a few minutes the attitude of reserve one is accustomed to experience in one's daily contacts. It is a very good opportunity forced upon one by its very simplicity and inconvenience. A larger size Hall or a smaller number of people in the same Hall would have taken away much of the benefit of these social gatherings. So, as the days progressed, more opportunities were presented for making new acquaintances and relations were established which could develop into further interesting contacts in the future. But this benefit of establishing new relations is a little too personal and one should perhaps elaborate on gains or benefits which might be passed to others and which form the susbstance of the conference.

I would say the main benefit of a conference of this nature where members are selected from among sociologists, agricultural technicians, historians, bankers, economists, press editors etc. – making a mixed composite group – is

the opportunity afforded to widen one's horizon of thinking. Belonging to the profession of economists, I found it very interesting to hear comments of experts in other fields, on what they thought about economists and their contributions to development planning. It was enlightenng to come across views and aspects of development problems for which I had not allowed a proper weight in the past; among these I may mention the importance of institutional changes which are necessary for successful planning.

Should one make any criticism of a generous host who has done its best to make the conference successful? It is probably true that in a conference where experts in various fields are participating the benefit each participant may derive is more likely to be in widening his horizon of thinking rather than in gaining further refinements in the techniques of his own profession. In view of the fact that out of 160 participants in discussions over 90 were from the U.K. it might be questioned whether the exchange of international ideas could not have been more balanced if a greater opportunity were not afforded for hearing the viewpoints and exposition of problems by those responsible directly or indirectly for development plans of the developing countries.

**EAST AFRICA**—*The East African Community*

The Treaty for East African Co-operation between Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya was signed by the Heads of State on 6th June, 1967.

Major features of the Treaty include:

**Article 1**

"By this Treaty the Contracting Parties establish among themselves an East African Community and, as an integral part of such Community, an East African Common Market."

**Article 2**

*Aims of the Community*

"It shall be the aim of the Community to strengthen and regulate the industrial, commercial and other relations of the Partner States to the end that there shall be accelerated, harmonious and balanced development and sustained expansion of economic activities the benefits whereof shall be equitably shared.

For the purposes set out in paragraph 1 and as hereinafter provided in the particular provisions of this Treaty, the Community shall use its best endeavours to ensure—

(a) the establishment and maintenance, subject to certain exceptions, of a common customs tariff and a common excise tariff;
(b) the abolition generally of restrictions on trade between Partner States;
(c) the inauguration, in the long term, of a common agricultural policy;
(d) the establishment of an East African Development Bank in accordance with the Charter contained in Annex VI to this Treaty;
(e) the retention of freedom of current accounts payments between the Partner States, and freedom of capital account payments necessary to further the aims of the Community.
(f) the harmonization, required for the proper functioning of the Common Market, of the monetary policies of the Partner States and

in particular consultation in case of any disequilibrium in the balances of payments of the Partner States;

(g) the operation of services common to the Partner States;
(h) the co-ordination of economic planning;
(i) the co-ordination of transport policy;
(j) the approximation of the commercial laws of the Partner States; and
(k) such other activities, calculated to further the aims of the Community, as the Partner States may from time to time decide to undertake in common."

**Article 3**

*Institutions of the Community*

"The Institutions of the Community shall be:

(i) the East African Authority
(ii) the East African Legislative Assembly
(iii) the East African Ministers
(iv) the Common Market Council
(v) the Common Market Tribunal
(vi) the Communications Council
(vii) the Finance Council
(viii) the Economic Consultative and Planning Council
(ix) the Research and Social Council,

and such other corporations, bodies, departments and services as are established or provided for by this Treaty."

**Article 49**

*Appointment of East African Ministers*

"There shall be three East African Ministers.

The Partner States shall each nominate one person, qualified under paragraph 3 of this Article, for appointment as an East African Minister, and the Authority shall appoint the persons so nominated to be East African Ministers."

**Article 56**

*Establishment and composition of the East African Legislative Assembly*

"There is hereby established for the Community a legislative body, to be known as the East African Legislative Assembly, which shall exercise the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty.

The members of the Assembly shall be:—

(a) the three East African Ministers;
(b) the three Deputy East African Ministers (if any);
(c) twenty-seven appointed members; and
(d) the Chairman of the Assembly, the Secretary General and the Counsel to the Community."

**Article 60**

*Assent to Bills*

"The President of the United Republic of Tanzania, the President of the Sovereign State of Uganda and the President of the Republic of Kenya may assent or withhold assent to a Bill.

A Bill that has not received the assent provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article within nine months of the date upon which it was passed by the Assembly shall lapse."

**Article 61**

*Offices in the Community*

"There shall be the following offices in the service of the Community:—

(a) a Secretary General, who shall be the principal executive officer of the Community;
(b) a Counsel to the Community; and
(c) an Auditor-General.

There shall be such other offices in the service of the Community as, subject to any Act of the Community, the Authority may determine."

**Article 62**

*Establishment of the East African Community Service Commission*

"There is hereby established a service commission to be known as the East African Community Service Commission for all offices in the service of the Community."

**Article 87**

*Location of Headquarters*

"It is agreed that:—

(a) the headquarters of the Community, including the Tribunal and the central secretariat, shall be at Arusha in Tanzania;
(b) the headquarters of the Bank shall be at Kampala in Uganda;
(c) the headquarters of the East African Railways Corporation shall be at Nairobi in Kenya;
(d) the headquarters of the East African Harbours Corporation shall be at Dar es Salaam in Tanzania;
(e) the headquarters of the East African Posts and Telecommunications Corporation shall be at Kampala in Uganda; and
(f) the headquarters of the East African Airways Corporation shall be at Nairobi in Kenya."

**Annex VI**—*Provides the Charter for the East African Development Bank.*

**Annex IX**—*Services to be administered by the Community or by the Corporations.*

"Part A—Services to be Administered by the Community

1. The secretariat of the Community, including services relating to the Common Market and the Chambers of the Counsel to the Community.
2. The East African Directorate of Civil Aviation.
3. The East African Meteorological Department.
4. The East African Customs and Excise Department.
5. The East African Income Tax Department.
6. The East African Industrial Council.
7. The East African Literature Bureau.
8. The Auditor-General's Department.

9. The East African Community Service Commission.
10. The East African Legislative Assembly."

also the existing East African natural resources and social services research organizations.

"Part B—Services to be Administered by the Corporations"

East African Railways
East African Harbours
East African Posts and Telegraphs
East African Airways"

**Annex X**—sets out the matters upon which the Community may enact legislation and these broadly follow the powers of the former East African Common Services Organization.

**World Population** - *Urban and Rural Growth*

The immense problem that will face urban planners and administrators during the remainder of the Twentieth Century is emphasized in the following tables which were included in the IULA Newsletter for January, 1968.

Growth of Urban and Rural Population by Continents

| Continent | 1920* | | 1960** | | 2000** | | Pop. 1960 | | Pop. 2000 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Urban | Rural | Urban | Rural | Urban | Rural | Millions | % | Millions | % |
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | | | | |
| Africa | 5 | 95 | 15 | 85 | 32 | 68 | 251 | 8.6 | 517 | 8.3 |
| North America | 38 | 62 | 84 | 16 | 90 | 10 | 196 | 6.7 | 312 | 4.9 |
| Latin America | 14 | 86 | 45 | 55 | 60 | 40 | 207 | 7.1 | 592 | 9.4 |
| Asia | 6 | 94 | 21 | 79 | 50 | 50 | 1,614 | 55.3 | 3,870 | 61.8 |
| Australia/Oceania | 34 | 66 | 63 | 37 | 75 | 25 | 16 | 0.6 | 29 | 0.5 |
| Europe | 25 | 75 | 54 | 46 | 70 | 30 | 633 | 21.7 | 947 | 15.1 |
| World Total | 14 | 86 | (25)* 34** | (75)* 66** | 54 | 46 | 2,917 | 100 | 6,267 | 100 |

* = population in localities of 20,000 or more inhabitants
** = population in localities of 2,000 or more inhabitants

SOURCES:—

*World Urbanization Trends*, 1920-1960, Paper prepared by the Population Division, U.N. Bureau of Social Affairs, Inter-regional Seminar on Development Policies and Planning in Relation to Urbanization, Pittsburgh, 1966.

Homer Hoyt, *World Urbanization: Expanding Population in a Shrinking World*, Urban Land Institute, Technical Bulletin No. 43, Washington, D.C. 1962.

**Colombo Plan**—*Special Topic*, 1967.

The Fifteenth Annual Report of the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee draws attention to the Special Topic for 1967: "The Availability and the Use of Resources for Increasing Agricultural Production in the Colombo Plan Area."

"Most of the countries of the Colombo Plan region have four challenging circumstances in common that are relevant in considering prospects for increasing agricultural production:

(i) In view of the high rates of population growth in the region, the reduction of world stocks of grains and in some instances, the rise in per capita incomes, the vital importance of quick action for increasing output of food;

(ii) Due to the concentration of rainfall in the monsoon regions in a small part of the year, the urgent need for intensive development and use of irrigation facilities;

(iii) A new volume of technical knowledge suitable to the areas, which can be exploited by intensive application on a package basis;

(iv) The importance of providing adequate marketing arrangements in some areas for farm products both at the domestic and international levels."

The Committee's conclusions included the following recommendations:

(a) "The Committee has reviewed the urgent problems of agriculture in the region, and the possibilities for better utilisation of available resources".

(b) "Recent advances in technology, particularly in respect of high yielding crop varieties, pave the way for more rapid growth in agricultural production."

(c) "There is a continuing need for further research, which should be well planned and directed to meet the need for future agricultural advance and for solving the problems which arise out of applying new techniques."

(d) "Incentives are necessary to induce farmers to adopt modern technology. In this context, stable prices and satisfactory price relationships are particularly important. Incentives can also be enhanced by reducing risks and uncertainties, by improving market intelligence and services, by creating buffer stocks and improving communications".

(e) "It is essential to have a greater supply of technically competent extension and farmer training services."

(f) "Adequate credit must be provided at the time it is required to enable farmers to purchase necessary inputs".

(g) "The adoption of advanced technology for agricultural production requires a rapid expansion of improved inputs necessary for production, including seed, fertiliser, pesticides and equipment. Countries of the region need to give special attention to the development of facilities and organisations for the production or importation and distribution of these inputs".

(h) "In the immediate future emphasis should be placed on making better use of existing irrigation facilities and developing minor irrigation projects. In planning irrigation, greater attention needs to be paid to water distribution to the field and drainage."

(i) "Increased production through the application of new technology will intensify the need for improvements in processing and storage."

**Nauru** - *Independence Constitution*

Nauru, the Pacific phosphate island of 8¼ square miles and some 3,100 Nauruan people, reached Independence and Republic status in 1968, following West Samoa as the second Trust Territory in the South Pacific to achieve independence. Head Chief Robert De Roburt who headed the Nauruan delegation to the Conference in Canberra has stated that Nauru will not seek membership of the United Nations as the country was too small.

The constitution will follow the framework of proposals submitted to a Canberra conference in May 1967. It will create the Republic of Nauru with a President who will also be Chief Minister. There will be a Cabinet and an Assembly; a Nauru judiciary (with, possibly, appeals to the Australian High Court); and a Public Service that will come under the Chief Minister's control. Elections to the Assembly will be by universal suffrage, and the President will be elected by the Assembly, to hold office during the Assembly's life.

There will be five Ministers besides the President/Chief Minister.

The working of the phosphate deposits on which the island's economy depends - some 60 million tons - has an expected life of about 25 years. The phosphate reserves are being bought by the Nauruans from the British Phosphate Corporation and the Islanders have contracted to sell the product at the rate of two million tons a year, at $11 a ton—estimated to give a net return of $6. For the remainder of the century therefore the new Republic should be assured of prosperity.

**Kano State, Nigeria** - *Area Courts*

Edict No. 2 of 1967 issued by the Military Governor of Kano abolishes the former Native Courts and establishes Area Courts in their place. The new Courts form part of an integrated judiciary.

The explanatory note provided with the Edict contains the following information:

"The purpose of this Edict is to give effect to the Military Government's decision to reform native courts by taking them over from native authorities and merging their administration with that of the High Court and Magistrates' Courts under the Chief Justice. Therefore they cease to be departments of native authorities or under the control of any Ministerial department of Government and their full independence in their judical functions is thus ensured.

"In place of the existing native courts, area courts are to be established by the Chief Justice. An area court will consist of an area judge sitting alone or with other members and questions of Moslem personal law will be determined by a member of an area court who is learned in Moslem law sitting alone. All area judges and members will be public officers in the public service of the State."

A new grade of Area Court called Upper Area Courts will exercise original and appellate jurisidiction. All area courts will be under the general supervision of the High Court and there is provision for the appointment of a Commissioner for Area Courts to advise the Chief Justice and to supervise area courts, and for Inspectors. Appeals from area courts lie to Upper Area Courts and thence to the Shazia Court of Appeal (in respect of cases involving questions of Moslem Personal law) or to the High Court.

No legal practitioner may appear to act for or assist any party before an Area Court.

**GUYANA** - *Local Government*

The Department of Government and Public Administration of the University of Guyana is starting a new course in local government. The syllabus for the academic year 1967-68 is as follows:—

A comparative study of the main principles of local government, including the meaning and importance of local self-government; urban and rural authorities, areas, and functions; local finance; methods of central control; administrative organization and efficiency; town and country planning.

The problems of transplanting and adapting local government institutions in new states, with particular reference to Guyana and the Caribbean, West Africa, and India. The special problems of rapid urbanization and of community development. Proposals for reform. Individual research projects.

**ZAMBIA** - *Four towns renamed*

The Zambian Ministry of Local Government has announced the renaming of the following towns:

Broken Hill becomes Kabwe,
Bancroft becomes Chiliabombwe,
Abercorn becomes Mbala and
Rosebery becomes Mbila.

**Development Administration** - *Statements Worth Noting*

"It is absolutely true that local councillors know far better than the Man from the Ministry how local people feel, for example, when roads are being driven through or near their property. But it must also be admitted that councillors are acting like Canute if they think it logical to try to defy, for example, motorway construction. In the last analysis it must be admitted that resources are limited, and that Whitehall must deploy them in the national interest. But it is the duty of local councillors to convey local sentiments to central government, and for progress to develop from mutual co-operation. Reform in short must not be synonymous with destruction. Efficiency does not mean riding rough-shod over the knowledge and feelings of local people. But if local government is not to atrophy under the weight of ridicule, inefficiency and lethargy, it must be revitalised by the intelligent application of democratic planning. A lively council can attract both good members and good officers. Intransigence to change will benefit only the backwoodsmen."

Alderman Betty Vernon
addressing London Boroughs Association,
*The Municipal Review*, January, 1968.

"Administrators do not grow like Topsy. They must be educated and trained as administrators over and above their training in their specialized work.

"The local government service as a whole, by reason of its fragmentation and relative lack of staff mobility is at a disadvantage in comparison with a unified service such as the Public Service in training and developing a corps of administrators fully-qualified to meet the multifarious and complex issues posed by rapid change.

"One possibility that might be worthy of consideration by your members, could be the setting up within the general framework of local government organizations of some type of staff agency. This could well evolve as a complementary development of the co-ordinating committee concept."

P. J. O'Dea, addressing the convention of the New Zealand Institute of Local Authority Administration, published in *New Zealand Local Government*, December 1967.

"We were guided throughout our deliberations by a sense of realism. We wanted to make recommendations which could be acted upon without legislation, without waiting interminably for other committees and commissions.

"Accordingly we have been reproached for this in some quarters. The report has been called a damp squib, no advance on poor old Hadow, lacking in revolutionary fervour and, in any case, quite useless because it has preceded the Royal Commission."

He said he had foreseen this because he knew what the critics - especially academic critics - enjoyed. "They enjoy stirring up controvrsy, marshalling opposing armies, stimulating argument and quarrelling, organizing opposition, making unrealistic proclamations, theoretical proposals and noisy denouncements - creating, in fact, exactly the climate in which nothing can be done, no changes made, no improvements pursued."

Sir George Mallaby addressing local authority representatives on "The Principles underlying the Mallaby Report" - reported in *The Municipal Review*, December, 1967.

"The politician is the instrument through which the people make their voices heard in the legislative body of the country. He is chosen by the people and he speaks for them in parliament and elsewhere. But as a member of parliament he has some responsibility to accept and advance the decisions of parliament on national programmes. It is perfectly correct that he should advance the interests of his constituency and he has a legitimate right to know what is going on in his constituency . . . but as a member of parliament, and a responsible citizen of a democratic country, he should not attempt to use his position of influence to bully civil servants into deviating from national programmes. It must be understood by everybody that civil servants are responsible to their ministers and cannot accept instructions from other politicians. District and Provincial Commissioners are responsible to me.

"The role of the civil servant is that of the professional. He is employed by the government to get things done. There are not many of us, I hope, who would presume to tell a doctor how and where to operate on a sick person. We should apply the same restraint in our dealings with other professionals -

and district commissioners are as much professionals as are doctors and engineers. I do not expect civil servants to advise the government on political feelings in the country . . ."

The President of Kenya opening the Kenya Institute of Administration Development Seminar, December, 1965.

"In contrast with the migrants of nineteenth-century England those who move to the growing towns of East Africa are not landless poor. Many continue to enjoy the security of a land holding and the addition to their income that it brings. All the same it is clear that, as conditions in the towns improve, more and more people will feel able to abandon their rural ties. The question is, how far and how fast can such a process go without doing more harm than good to countries like those of East Africa? Resources are scarce and if governments choose to ignore the fact that they have an indigenous social security system, and attempt to provide fullscale services in towns, there is no doubt that increasing numbers will want to settle permanently in the towns. The cost will, however, be great. If the number of jobs does not grow as fast as the number wanting to settle in the towns, urban unemployment will grow. Improving urban conditions does not create additional employment, but if it is financed from funds that might have been used to improve the profitability of agriculture it will merely serve to tilt the balance of advantages still more in favour of working in town as opposed to remaining in agriculture. If instead these funds were used to make agricuture pay more, this would lead to a better balance between new jobs in towns and the demand for them. Meanwhile circular migration, while it lasts, should be seen not as an evil or a concomitant of backwardness but as a process that lowers the cost of development."

The concluding paragraph in Professor Elkans article on Circular Migration and the Growth of Towns in East Africa. *International Labour Review;* December, 1967.

"If the West wants to give the best that it has, is expensive ironmongery the most it can do? Surely the most valuable thing the West has to offer is the knowledge derived from its scientific development. Just as this knowledge has been applied to developing a technology which meets the needs of the West, that is, labour-saving, capital-intensive and generally large-scale technology, so it can equally well be applied to meet the needs of countries which are rich in labour and natural resources, but where capital is very scarce.

"It would be a different technology, but one appropriate to the needs of those who stand most in need of help."

George McRobie writing in the *Asian Review*, January, 1968.

"Waterston has said that 'the cost of corruption is also smaller than the cost of time-consuming administrative procedures and official circumlocu-

tions which delay necessary action unduly.' Private investors and contractors, whose plans depend on the decisions of the government, face handicaps because of rigidly followed rules and regulations. To obtain approval for a business transaction often requires a businessman to fill out numerous forms, to visit several government offices and to wait outside government offices for long periods, sometimes for many days.

"A leading spokesman for private business in India said that the officers 'are afraid to take decisions because when you take decisions, you make some mistakes for which blame may be apportioned later. The safest position, therefore, for the services to avoid mistakes is not to act. This, I fear, is happening in India at present. By this delay we have lost hundreds of crores in foreign exchange and in production.' Shifting of responsibility is also common. Interestingly enough sometimes the committees and conferences are meant not for taking the decisions but avoiding them!"

(From an Article by Keshav E. Sharma in *International Review of Administrative Sciences*. Vol. XXXIII—1967, No. 2).

# Book Reviews

**Samoa ma Samoa: The Emergence of the Independent State of Western Samoa,** by J. W. DAVIDSON; *Oxford University Press, Melbourne,* 1967, pp. xii, 467, endpaper maps; $A9.75.

In a review in the January issue of this Journal, Professor W. J. M. Mackenzie wrote: "Fifteen years ago no one (however extreme) would have had any patience with the notion of independent Gambia, independent Barbados, independent Malta. These were not 'viable' ". Since then, as he points out, we have entered on the less inhibited era of "liberate and be damned"; one result has been the proliferation of micro-states.

Such a state is Western Samoa, whose domain is a pair of mountainous tropical islands about two-thirds of the way north from New Zealand to the Equator. It became legally independent on 1st January 1962. It had been in turn a League of Nations mandated territory and a U.N. trust territory under New Zealand administration, and before that a German colony from 1900 to 1914, under a partition of the whole Samoan group between Germany and the United States. But the group had been subject to continuous European influence and some settlement since 1830, giving time for a complete conversion of the inhabitants to Christianity, a partial conversion of the economy to a Western plantation and overseas trading system, and the attainment of universal literacy well before self-government became a reality.

At the time of independence, the population of Western Samoa was just under 120,000, but rising at the rate of 3 per cent per annum; the economy was self-supporting showing doubtful potentiality for being able to keep up with population growth; and there had never been any substantial dependency on external financial aid. After independence, the New Zealand government by treaty undertook to help Western Samoa in the conduct of its external relations; at the same time the latter's government decided not to establish any defence forces, "since they would not possess the strength to repel any likely aggressor". They also decided not to seek membership of the Commonwealth, fearing opposition by some existing members, nor to join the United Nations, because of the cost of representation. If "viability" concerned the architects of independence in this case, its only canon was the framing of a workable constitution, on the evidence of this book.

Professor Davidson has written a comprehensive and, with one important qualification, a definitive history of Western Samoa's transition from colonial rule to independence, based on an exhaustive examination of a surprising wealth of written sources. After a brief survey of the whole period of European contact and its impact on the structure of Samoan society, two-thirds of the work deals in detail with constitutional evolution through self-government to independence since 1946. One chapter in this part discusses, with a somewhat muted sense of urgency, the rather perfunctory approach of New Zealand and Samoan politicians alike to the needed modernisation of an extremely conservative economic system. Another describes the abortive attempt, during the 1940's and 1950's, to reconstruct the neglected and essentially

traditional system of local administration. But the main concern is with the tortuous process through which a more representative and effective central legislature and executive structure was reached, by means of fitful and often mutually mistrustful interaction between European officials in New Zealand and Samoa, urbanized community leaders in Samoa, both European and native, Samoan political leaders with varying commitments to traditional ways and interests, and a number of unofficial expert advisers.

Among the latter Professor Davidson himself played a prominent part, and here enters the qualification to the definitiveness of his account. As a student of colonial affairs and Pacific historian, and a New Zealander by birth, he was invited by the New Zealand Prime Minister in 1947 to report on political developments in Samoa. From that time until independence, during periods of leave from his universities in Cambridge and (after 1951) in Canberra, he was intimately involved in various ways with the process of constitutional and administrative evolution: at different stages he became a senior officer in the Samoan administration, a member of the legislature, chairman of various commissions of inquiry and a member of constitutional drafting committees, and adviser to the Prime Minister of Samoa. In these roles he made an intensive study of Samoan history, culture and attitudes, and sought to see the current issues so far as possible through Samoan eyes. He established close relations with Samoan leaders as well as with some of his European colleagues, and as he says, "often my position was that of a passionate partisan" hence perhaps the title "Samoa ma Samoa" meaning "Samoa for the Samoans".

This was a unique vantage point for an academic study of decolonisation, it imparts a flavour of unusual intimacy and authenticity to the book's analysis of negotiations and the motivations behind them. But it has its drawbacks; of which Davidson explicitly recognises the main one: the difficulty of remaining objective. There is plenty of evidence that New Zealand's record as an administering power was no happier than that of most other governments in a like situation, and that it fumbled often enough even during the last twenty years when it was seeking to make amends. Davidson writes with restraint - indeed with something of the sententious ponderousness of the official style which his duties for so long must have imposed on him. But he does not conceal his likes and dislikes among those with whom he worked, and the policies they represented - so long as they were not Samoans. These judgments may naturally seem tendentious to other actors, and his estimates of their respective contributions - and his own - to the political emancipation of the Samoans may well be open to question. He has the honesty to invite such questioning in his Introduction.

As the work of an historian and participant-observer, the book is meticulous in detail (sometimes tediously so except, no doubt, for Samoan readers) and highly personalised in method. It gives a day-to-day, often hour-by-hour narrative in terms of the ideas, ambitions, and social or administrative ties of leading individuals. If the reader is not to flounder, especially among the scores of polysyllabic Polynesian names and genealogies, this method calls for a more vivid delineation of personality and character than was possible for an author so closely involved in the community he describes. In this minor respect the book is hard going for an outsider.

More importantly, while the author calls to his aid the experience and

literature of other decolonising efforts for his analysis of Western Samoan history, he is not concerned to draw broader comparative conclusions from this essentially empirical study. It remains a mine of sensitive observation and subtle interpretation from which students of comparative politics and modernisation theory may quarry as they seldom have the opportunity (and some of them seldom the sense) to do. For such students, a theme of focal interest would be the resilience of Samoan traditional polity and culture, the power and deference accorded to its proud and jealous aristocracy, and the part which the latter's leaders were enabled to play in framing constitutions for their future nation. One senses that Professor Davidson himself is a little uneasy about the conservatism of the result (which, for example, leaves universal suffrage still somewhere in the indefinite future). But he would probably claim that this errs on the right side, so far as it was achieved by friendly negotiation and offers some assurance that Samoans themselves will accept responsibility for the outcome. His book, in fact, makes a case for the broad pattern that was followed, as well as giving us a close-up of the weaving of the fabric, thread by thread.

R. S. PARKER.

**Field Administration: An aspect of decentralisation,** BRIAN C. SMITH; *Routledge and Regal Paul*, 1967; pp. viii, 135; 15s.

This is the ninth monograph in the paperback Library of Political Studies designed, under the general editorship of Professor Wiseman of Exeter, for university students reading government or politics. Though some of the editor's colleagues may query the assumptions in his claim that this little series will eventually provide a comprensive coverage "in a more interesting and fundamental manner than in the large volume which often fails to compensate by breadth what it inevitably lacks in depth", this particular volume fulfils its own goal of analysing an important but somewhat neglected aspect of decentralisation. Mr Smith argues that when we talk about politics and administration, too often we are thinking only of decisions taken at the national seat of government. Following Henry Maddick, he distinguishes between "deconcentration" (administrative decentralisation) and "devolution" (political decentralisation), and considers three types of field administration: functional, integrated prefectoral and unintegrated (this is Fried's conceptualisation).

What is this three-fold typology? In the functional system, the central government's principal field agents are part of separate hierarchies responsible for distinct aspects of policy, e.g., agriculture, education: "functional independence in the field means that, although there may be a set of administrative territories for field administration, there is no generalist representative of government in each area exercising overall responsibility for governmental functions". In the first prefectoral system, where the prefect is taken as a convenient title for the central executive's general representative in the provinces and acts as a link in the chain of command between H.Q. and the field for all government services, the concept of integration is applied to the dual relationship between the prefect and the other field officers of the central executive on the one hand, and between him and the local government on the other. The unintegrated system departs from this

classical model in its handling of these dual relationships between the prefect and his co-workers, for he now becomes "head of a territory which no field service of the central government uses". This is the essential feature of an administrative system known under its older label as Indirect Rule - here defined by Mr. Smith as "government by the co-operation of indigenous political elements and the agents of the colonial power through field administration of a prefectoral variety". In this book, the three categories of field administration are illustrated by an analysis of, respectively, the Ministry of Agriculture in the U.K., the Burmese District Commissioners, and the Africanised cadres of District Officers in Northern Nigeria.

Despite the almost unavoidable "smell of stale cooking" that attaches to textbooks of the reductive variety, Mr. Smith has done a good job in extracting data from the works of leading scholars concerned with the theory and practice of field administration. But in a book of this potential, it is disappointing to find so many paragraphs of skilfully distilled facts lamely concluding, like some undergraduate essay, with a parenthesized acknowledgement of the source (pp. 45 - 52 offer a notorious sample). Buell, writing fifty years ago, is perhaps not the most convincing authority to cite on francophone African political institutions, and a careful writer might have thought it worth taking the trouble to convert sq. kilometres into a handier unit for the English-speaking students for whom the book is written and to find, while on the spot in Nigeria, more recent budget figures than those of 1962. Juster, too, would have been the ascription of the "scaffolding" theory of field administration to Dame Margery Perham rather than, apparently, to a book written 30 years later - whose author would be the first to give credit where it is due.

The current interest in field administration, hitherto neglected, is timely: in the U.S.A., nearly 90 per cent of the federal public servants are employed in a field capacity, and in Northern Nigeria the figure is over 75 per cent. Thus field administrators of the "over the counter" as well as the "bush and boma" type will join students reading political science in their welcome of Mr. Smith's digest of and guide to the inter-relationships of decentralized government. His recognition that in its field operation bureaucracy takes on a multifunctional role, i.e. it performs political and social functions as well as administrative ones, is as valid for the emergent nations as it was in the colonial days. So, too, is his endorsement of Maddick's assertion that where delegation is absent decentralisation becomes frustrated by a lack of authority, while at the centre authority needs to be supported by that detailed familiarity with local conditions that is the forte of the field officer. Mr. Smith's exhortation to us to be continually on the look out for the actual functions performed by field administration over and above their official roles as set out in government policy papers, and his important warning that, in constructing our bureaucratic models we must set them against a background of socio-economic and other environmental factors that influence field administration, encourage us to look forward to further analyses from Mr. Smith, this time hopefully derived more from his own experience and alert-minded observation.

A. H. M. KIRK-GREENE.

(*NOTE: This review was written in December*, 1967 - *Ed.*)

**Customary Land Law in Africa,** by FRANK MIFSUD; *F.A.O., Rome*; pp. 94; 10s.

This study is a review of customary land law in Africa "with reference to legislation aimed at adjusting customary tenures to the needs of development". It was originally prepared for the World Land Tenure Conference held in Rome in June 1966 and was undoubtedly one of the best and most useful of the many background papers. Its separate publication in the F.A.O. legislative series is therefore very welcome, particularly as hitherto the subject has not received from F.A.O. the specialised attention it really requires.

As Mr. Mifsud points out in his introduction, the occupation of land in rural areas by the indigenous population in newly independent countries is largely governed by local custom and it is commonly held that this is a factor gravely inhibiting economic progress. The impetus given to land tenure legislation by many of the new authorities is indicative of their dissatisfaction with the present state of affairs but, of course, the degree and type of legislative intervention has by no means been uniform nor has it invariably followed the same pattern. Mr. Mifsud surveys some of the significant efforts made in this field in selected countries.

He devotes his first chapter to "Recording of customary law" and firmly states that "there is need in many countries in Africa for a systematic, comprehensive and up-to-date recording of customary law". He points out that "criticism of any particular law, unless it has been satisfactorily recorded, must necessarily be uninformed", but perhaps this is a little too facile in this context. What does not exist cannot be recorded and, so far as land tenure is concerned, the main shortcoming of customary law is the lack of provision for situations which inevitably develop with the growth of a cash economy based on permanent improvements to the land and on long-term crops. However, until a formal record has been produced, as it now has been for example in Kenya, Tanzania and Malawi, it can be argued that it is not really possible to evaluate customary law, at least not if the evaluation is to be acceptable to African governments.

There is a chapter on "Succession" which he rightly calls "One of the most intractable branches of customary land law" and leaves us in no doubt of the manifold difficulties it presents. There is also a chapter on "Legislation instituting new land systems" which contains useful sections on co-operative farming and on settlement schemes, but the most interesting and important chapter is entitled "Individualisation of tenure". In this he deals with the adjudication of customary rights. He begins by describing the sporadic process followed in former French colonies and then turns to the systematic process which was first carried out, under the name of settlement, in the Sudan, and which has subsequently been adapted for use in Kenya, Uganda and Zambia. To these must now be added Malawi. In this chapter he also covers registration of title which "in practice is usually associated with individualisation of tenure", though he points out that "there is no valid objection in law for not recognising families as land holding units" and draws attention to the fact that the Registered Land Act, 1964, of Lagos, Nigeria, recognises family ownership. There is, in fact, a wealth of comparative detail which will be of great interest to all those concerned with the formalisation of title in Africa.

Let no one underrate the importance of the subject. Land is our main

source of life. From it we derive all our material needs and wealth, whether grain, gold, oil or anything else which man uses or values. We live on the land and from the land - and its distribution and use are of transcendent importance in the affairs of mankind. In tropical Africa that distribution and that use are still mainly governed by custom, adequate enough in former days but more and more suspect as populations grow and there is ever increasing pressure on the land. Mr. Mifsud has listed for us many of the resultant problems; better still he has indicated where to look for examples or possible solutions which have been tried with varying measures of success.

This little book is, indeed, a most valuable publication which merits study in all former colonial territories in Africa. It will encourage a practical approach to customary tenure and the problems connected with it. There is wide scope for positive action, and positive action is essential if the vast areas of "customary land" in tropical Africa are to play their full part in enabling the "developing countries" to develop.

ROWTON SIMPSON.

**The Union of Burma: A Study of the First Years of Independence,** by HUGH TINKER; 4th edition; *Oxford University Press* for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. With bibliographies, maps, index and glossaries; pp. xiv, 423; 50s.

When Professor Tinker's book first appeared in 1957, it was described (by a reviewer in *The Economist*) as "scholarly and exhaustive" and "likely to become the standard work on Burma since independence". So far as concerns the "first years of independence" which the author originally set out to chronicle and appraise, these verdicts are amply justified by the fact that by last year the book had run to a fourth edition.

Some fresh material was added in the year after first publication, and in bringing his text up to date for this fourth edition, Professor Tinker has for the most part adopted the device of adding to the ends of some of his chapters paragraphs covering events up to the seizure of power by General Ne Win in the Spring of 1962, and in a few cases developments more recent still - e.g. at the end of chapter VI dealing with "Culture and Religion". Some parts of the earlier texts have been re-written, and it is noteworthy that Mr. Tinker has seen fit to modify or withdraw some of the rather optimistic judgments and conjectures concerning present potentialities and future trends that appeared in the first edition - e.g. at the end of Chapter IX on "Trade"; Chapter XI on "Defence" and Chapter XII on "Foreign Relations".

This expansion piecemeal of a work originally designed within a more limited scope is not wholly successful or satisfactory. Owing, no doubt, to limitations of space, and to the difficulty of access to adequate and reliable source material covering developments in Burma since 1957, these additional paragraphs are necessarily brief, sketchy and for the most part amount to little more than notes or resumés on events, trends and personalities. They are not, for that reason, without interest, but the narrative force and detail of the earlier parts of the chapters are lacking. In essence, therefore, this fourth edition of "The Union of Burma" remains what it was originally designed to be - a study of the first 10 years or so of Burma's independence. So much the author acknowledged in his Note to the third edition, here reprinted. As

such, it is a remarkable *tour de force* of compression, clarity and comprehensiveness. Although strictly speaking the story begins, historically, with Burmese independence in January 1948, Professor Tinker helpfully introduced several of his chapters with a survey leading up to that crucial event - as in the opening chapter on "British Rule and Independence"; Chapter VIII on "The Land, Agriculture and Forests"; and Chapter XI on "Defence", where he goes back, in some detail, into the earlier history of Burma and the British connexion and the background from which the events and personalities of the last 30 or 40 years were evolved. Chapter I is, indeed, a masterly survey, in a nutshell, of Burma's progress from the Annexation in 1886, through "Dyarchy", Separation and war, to independence and - alas - turmoil and revolt. Such a wealth of information is packed into these first 30 pages that a reader coming new to the study of Burma's history could hardly escape being somewhat bewildered by the profusion of dates, facts and unfamiliar names of people and places. To someone already familiar with the story, or who witnessed its last phases, the telling is a powerful reminder of some of the less well-known episodes of the twilight of Empire.

This fourth edition illustrates that it is not really practicable to try repeatedly to bring up to date a book which is at once a survey of recent history and a commentary on some of the "philosophy" that guides the efforts of many of the newly independent underdeveloped nations to bring themselves, economically and otherwise, at high speed into the second half of the 20th century. Perhaps Professor Tinker will oblige us, in a few years' time, with a fresh book as a sequel to this. It will admittedly be difficult to choose a suitable point of time at which to stop. The Burmese have not, so far, experienced again so climactic an event as the achievement of independence on 4th January, 1948.

A few slips and debatable points have persisted into this fourth edition - some, no doubt, owing to the method of re-printing that has been used. In the glossary (pp. xi-xiv), a "ywa-gaung" (under "gaung" ="head") was not, strictly speaking, a village headman (ywa-thugyi) but the head of a "quarter" of a large village or of an outlying hamlet. "Myo" (p. xiii) is the ordinary Burmese word for "town" or "city", and signified, historically, a fortified place or citadel, not "land or domain". The term "Kala(s)" (more correctly "kula(s)") (p. 338), which is the word used nowadays in colloquial Burmese - often somewhat disparagingly - to signify natives of India (or Pakistan) generally, does not appear in the glossary, and would be likely to puzzle readers not acquainted with local usage. It was hardly correct any longer "in pre-war days" to say that the administrative districts of Burma were "ruled" by Deputy Commissioners (p. 130); the day when a district officer was "king" of his territory in any "Sanders of the River" sense had long since passed! The "strange compulsion on the loyalties of the peasants" said to be exercised by the "underground communists" (p. 238) is hardly strange at all - it is maintained in Burma, as elsewhere in Asia, by the simple device of naked force! "Rafts" (Burmese "hpaung") rather than "barges" (p. 248) is the term applicable to the flotation of timber and bamboo in quantity down the rivers. It is not true that in Akyab "only one building remained undamaged in the town and port" at the end of the war (p. 291). At the foot of p. 326 a line of the text has got lost in the reprinting; the missing words are "The policy of the Government is authoritatively said to provide . . ."

etc. I must confess to being still puzzled by the "bare scaffolding" on p. 310 which is "in many directions only a half-drawn blueprint!"

The appendix "Men and Women of Burma", containing brief notes on the principal personalities mentioned in the text, is valuable for readers new to the study of Burmese affairs. A few of the entries have been revised for this fourth edition, but further revision is needed; for example, Burma's second President, Dr. Ba U, died in November 1963, and the entry on U Thant, for example, makes no mention of the fact that he has been Secretary-General of the United Nations since 1962 and is thus Burma's most distinguished son.

G. L. MERRELLS.

**British Development Policies, Needs and Prospects 1968,** edited by ANDRZEJ KRASSOWSKI and TOM SOPER; *Overseas Development Institute;* pp. 83; 12s. 6d.

O.D.I. has followed a recent trend; instead of the somewhat cumbersome use of "developed" and "less developed" countries, the former are dubbed "North" and the latter "South" - rather like the names given to armies during military manoeuvres - one hopes that the idea will be rapidly abandoned: North and South are compass points and should remain so.

This is O.D.I.'s second annual review. This time, tables are limited to five, so, for once, an O.D.I. publication does not brim with facts and figures. The editors may feel that their sombre account of the widening gap between rich and poor, the slow process of replenishing the resources of I.D.A., the implications of their own economic problems inhibiting U.K. and U.S.A. from any expansion of their Aid programmes, all speak for themselves without need for weighty statistical data; besides, as they point out, far more official information is now readily available than hitherto and in this field two Ministry of Overseas Development White Papers are commended (Cmnd. 2736 and Cmnd. 3180) together with O.D.M.'s annual publication *British Aid.*

On the one hand O.D.I. is critical of top British political leadership and pessimistic over seeing the drive for a thought-out comprehensive policy towards the Third World being given the overriding priority they feel is urgently required.

On the other hand the dedication of aid administrators and the extent of public opinion supporting aid are noted, and attention is drawn to the minimal effects on the aid programme made by the British Government's recent economy measures.

The opportunity is taken to reiterate Dr. Soper's surely incontrovertible contention (emphasised in his *Aid Management Overseas* published by O.D.I. in 1967) that there is no better way of achieving good aid management than to expand development divisions and the number of full-time aid administrators overseas.

A short chapter is devoted to population growth; while the objectives of the International Planned Parenthood Federation (as expressed in Chile in 1967) are welcomed, the basic organisational and administrative problems, implicit therein, are not regarded as the major hurdles now to be faced. But effective population control will not, as is suggested here, be achieved by scientific dicta and a plentiful supply of cheap pills; this immense social problem can only be resolved (except by tyrants) if there is full popular

participation in a public policy for control and for this the major prerequisite is a great organisational and administrative effort in which community leaders and social workers have a role to play as important as that of demographers, chemists and aid dispensers.

While this book is entitled a "review", it is discursive rather than factual and therefore rather more controversial than one would otherwise expect. This is no bad thing at all. Let readers have food for thought besides facts to note and they may be stimulated to deeds - for O.D.I. is in effect making a call to the British Government and the British people for enlightened action in the field of aid.

P.H.J.

# Other Books Received

**Political and Social Science,** by W. J. M. MACKENZIE; *Penguin Books;* notes, book list, index; pp. 424; 7s. 6d.

Professor Mackenzie has provided the academic world with a major work on political science which will surely be read very widely in the Universities of many lands.

"Political science has in its nature been the social discipline that lies closest to power . . . much of the academic work described . . . is recognizably ideological, in that it is the persuasive exposition of a point of view, masquerading as theorem and proof. So indeed is the book itself; its aim is descriptive, but description involves selection, synthesis and sequence, and the result is recommendation. The recommendations . . . are tentative and complex".

This extract from the Introductory Chapter exemplifies the intellectual integrity of the whole book.

On development administration Professor Mackenzie points out that "it is always and everywhere difficult to reform an existing administration: Britain in this respect is much the same as Thailand, and therefore one needs no special theory to explain the difference"–"there is no conceptual difference between the problem of modernisation in Africa . . . and in Britain" – in the former governments tend to use the bulldozer too much, in the latter too little, each for their own reasons.

In a stimulating penultimate chapter on change Hans Morgenthan is quoted: "as military policy is too important a matter to be left ultimately to the generals, so is foreign aid too important to be left in the end to the economists".

Politics and power go hand in hand. If the soldier or the economist has the final decision-taking in his own hands then he holds power and the politician will have abdicated.

A very great deal of wisdom and learning is inexpensively costed at 7s. 6d.

**Governing Urban Society: New Scientific Approaches.** Monograph 7, edited by STEPHEN B. SWEENEY and JAMES C. CHARLESWORTH, *The American Academy of Political and Social Science of Philadelphia,* May 1967; with appendix, pp. 250; $1.75.

This well produced monograph should stimulate much thought on optimal approaches to urban planning in the United States.

The Editors, naively perhaps, believe that having entered the era of technocracy, scientists with their computors will regulate future urban development. "Urban observatories" a phrase invented by Professor Wood (formerly of M.I.T. and now Under Secretary in the Department of Housing and Urban Development) are to be the means of providing basic research into urban requirements. One contributor has coined "urbanology" to describe this study by the observatory method and so no doubt Urbanologists will be created. Another foresees the M.E.D.L.A.R. (medical) automated information storage system as a forerunner to a future national urban library.

Emphasis is placed on the need for more intellectual talent to be devoted to urban problems, but there is no mention of the American-backed study of Ekistics in Greece which would seem relevant.

In Quarterly Notes we provide statistics indicating the probable growth of urban populations up to 2000 AD. Thought needs to be given to how far the general pattern will follow that in the United States where, as the Editors point out, four-fifths of the largest cities have lost population in the past decade, while peripheral communities have had a teeming growth – suburbs wishing for no unity with each other nor for consolidation with the central city, but which, it is suggested, may be integrated functionally and procedurally through the use of systems and machines.

One reads much of the critical social problems of the big American cities. It may be that faced with crisis the State may turn to the forward-looking urban thinkers whose ideas sparkle through this volume.

**Apartheid - its effects on education, science, culture and information.** *U.N.E.S.C.O., Paris*, pp. 205; 8s.

This study was undertaken by U.N.E.S.C.O. at the request of the Secretary General of the United Nations.

The unedifying, sordid story of discrimination is told in clear factual and unemotional terms and it will suffice here to quote two passages:

From the Introduction –

"In spite of the ideology of apartheid, in spite of the uprooting of thousands of families, the complete separation of peoples into tribal and ethnic groupings in South Africa has proved impossible. The closely integrated economic structure, the location of all the major industries, all the mineral wealth, all the important harbour facilities and all the best arable land in that part of South Africa which was outside the reserves, in White ownership meant that Africans – as well as Coloureds and Asians – remain dependent on the town and farming complex of White South Africa for a livelihood. Even the government's attempt to encourage African-owned small-scale industries in the Transkei has come up against the relative poverty of the area, the comparative lack of natural resources and the lack of accumulated capital. For good or ill, White and non-White South Africa remain economically interdependent".

And from the Conclusion –

"This report concludes most explicitly that in education, science, culture and information, apartheid violates, both in principle and in practice, the United Nations Charter, the Constitution of U.N.E.S.C.O., the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as the standards which have been set by the international community in conventions, recommendations and declarations which have been adopted within the United Nations system". "The image of man – to whatever ethnic group he belongs or is made a part of – which results from the policy of apartheid in South Africa, is an image which is clearly opposite the one to which the community of nations is ethically and legally dedicated".

"It is with the knowledge of such a danger"(of racial conflict in South Africa generating grave international repercussions)"and with the full consciousness of U.N.E.S.C.O.'s dedication to the dignity of man and peace" that the report has been drawn up.

**Race Relations,** by MICHAEL BANTON; *Social Science Paperbacks, Associated Books Publishers, London, E.C.4.* 1967; index; pp. 393; 35s.

From Aristotle to Darwin and on to Max Gluckman and Gunnar Myrdal, Michael Banton provides a wide coverage of philosophical thinking on race relations. His main theme, however, is concentrated on developments in Africa, Britain and the United States. In this context it needs to be remembered when slavery is discussed that the odious state of slavery was endured (and, alas, is still endured) far beyond the confines of the New World.

Policy makers would do well to study the pages on racial patterns in crowded cities where contemporary human contacts provide the most dangerous explosive material.

**Law In Africa - Criminal law in East and Central Africa,** by J. J. R. COLLINGWOOD; *Sweet and Maxwell, London*, 1967; index; pp. 313; £1 17s. 6d. (Paperback for sale in Africa only: £1 2s. 6d.)

This Volume is No. 23 in the admirable series on Law in Africa sponsored by the publishers.

The criminal laws of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia are discussed and explained. Significantly are the British-based criminal codes albeit containing divergencies, but sufficiently similar for comparative study and joint exposition.

Mr. Collingwood explains his use of "Tanganyika" in 1967 – there are occasions however, in Preface and Index for example, when "Tanzania" should certainly have been used instead. This book will be invaluable to Bar, Bench and Law School.

**Nigerian Practice Notes - A guide to Stamp Duties,** by P. G. WILLOUGHBY; *Sweet and Maxwell*, pp. 89; 21s.

This is the first text book to be published on the Nigerian law of Stamp Duties and should prove of considerable practical value both to law students and to solicitors.

**The Art of Judgment - A study of Policy Making,** by Sir GEOFFREY VICKERS; *Methuen, London* (*University Paperbacks*, 1968); pp. 242; 15s.

Originally published in 1965 and now available as a paperback, Sir Geoffrey Vickers' felicitously written essays on judgement make profitable as well as pleasurable reading for those concerned with policy making, be their roles in public or private enterprise, in central or local government.

Sir Geoffrey includes a quotation from T. H. Huxley when explaining what policy making means: "as policy makers we aspire . . . to maintain and improve, in opposition to the state of nature, the state of Art of an organized polity . . . And when we are not wholly absorbed in averting the perils which we have generated, this is the dream which absorbs us. It is a dream born of *human* values, a dream born of the fact that the planet is still dominated by men, not cockroaches; and we deem it a noble dream, because we value it so with the best value judgment we can achieve".

The reader will find no pettiness or undue solemnity, but much that is stimulating and provocative.

**New Education Media in Action,** *U.N.E.S.C.O.: International Institute for Educational Planning, Paris;* Vol. II; pp. 226, Vol. III; pp. 198; each Volume 9s.

These volumes contain 17 case studies largely concerned with education by television now in use: in Africa – Algeria, Ivory Coast, Niger and Nigeria: in South America – Columbia and Peru: in Chicago and in six midwest States of the U.S.A.; in Europe – Italy. Radiovision/Radio clubs in Niger, Togo and Honduras, radio use in correspondence schooling in New Zealand, and Inservice training for U.N.R.W.A./U.N.E.S.C.O. teachers are also the subjects of studies reported.

There is much of very real and practical interest to attract the attention of educational planners. There are examples of new media which involve no heavy financial strain, and for the wealthy there is the example of the American M.P.A.T.I. system of airborne educational television.

**The Relation of Educational Plans to Economic and Social Planning,** by R. POIGNANT; *U.N.E.S.C.O.;* pp. 51; 5s.

Mr. Poignant sets out to explain how education and training are integrated into economic and social plans. He deals first with the financial aspects and secondly with the objectives of educational expansion. In conclusion he emphasises the long-term investment value of funds spent on education to the economic expansion of a developing country.

**Readings in the Applied Economics of Africa. Vol. I, Micro-Economics; Vol. II, Macro-Economics;** edited by EDITH H. WHETHAM and JEAN I. CURRIE; *Cambridge University Press*, 1967; pp. 216 and 227 respectively, each Vol. 12s. 6d. or $2.25.

These two volumes are intended for use in African Universities. They contain 32 papers selected by the Editors from sundry publications dating from 1955 to 1966, covering many aspects of public accounting and economic development, together with the agricultural and industrial use of resources, prices and markets.

The student will need to watch with care for that which is of contemporary relevance and that which is of historical background interest only. Commercial banking is no longer relevant to Tanzania nor pre-1963 "recent" budgets in Ghana; the Ngoni labour migration studied by Dr. Gulliver is now of academic interest only. While the collation of so much material in two small volumes will be of real value to those studying African economics, their reading should not be regarded as an excuse for avoiding much recent literature, particularly that on agriculture development which is now readily available.

**Imperial Japan's Higher Civil Service Examinations,** by ROBERT S. SPAULDING Jnr.; *Oxford University Press, London; Princeton University Press, U.S.A.;* appendices, bibliography, index; pp. 416; £4 15s.

The Dragon Gate is the metaphor applied in Japan to the state examinations that provide access to the élite profession of the higher civil service. Dr. Spaulding suggests that the efficacy of her top bureaucracy had much to do with the successful modernisation of Japan – the achievement of rapidly gained high levels of political, economic and social development, that promotion to senior posts on the "merit principle" was the means of moulding the bureaucracy into the highly competent shape that was needed and obtained.

Covering the period 1868-1945, the formulative years of modern Japan, Dr. Spaulding writing in lively style, provides a historically-orientated study which should have wide appeal to those interested in the remarkable progress of Japan as a world power and also to those who seek a key to similar developments in other countries now striving for development.

**Western Interests in the Pacific Realm,** by THOMAS R. ADAM; *Random House, New York;* notes, bibliography, index; pp. 246; $2.95.

Professor Adam ranges in this political study over the wide extent of the Pacific, with a felicitous, jargon-free pen. Strangely most of Malaysia and Indonesia is off the map and in the book, while Nauru is without mention in either. Professor Adam is clearly something of an idealist and he will doubtless have suffered disillusion from Britain's recent announcement of withdrawal East of Suez – a decision which he does not appear to have foreseen. His skill at light thumbnail sketches is well illustrated in the few paragraphs that sum up the march of historical events in Tonga.

**Books on the British Empire and Commonwealth,** by JOHN E. FLINT; *Oxford University Press,* 1968; pp. 66; 12s. 6d.

Professor Flint has produced for the Royal Commonwealth Society an excellent bibliography – covering historical and political literature together with a selection of descriptive, geographic, economic and literary works.

This guide should prove most valuable not only to students but also to the generality of readers interested in the history of the Commonwealth.

**The Colorado Pre-Primary System,** by R. JOHN EYRE and CURTIS MARTIN; *Bureau of Government Research and Service, University of Colorado,* 1967; pp. xii, 166, bibliography, appendix and index; paper $3.50. hard cover $6. 00.

The Colorado Pre-primary Convention System and its variants function in more than half a dozen American States, and provides the State Government mechanism for dealing with nominations and elections of officials; the authors explain the system with particular reference to high elective offices (to Congress, Governorship and State legislature). It is a system that tends to choke the chances of independent candidates and to strengthen Party control over nominations—but it does provide for the Voter a choice between several candidates of his own party and so can be said to encourage democratic practice.

**The Politics of Conformity in Latin America,** edited by CLAUDIO VELIZ; *Oxford University Press;* index; pp. 291; 45s.

Eight contributors drawn from North America and Europe, as well as Latin America, each provide a chapter to this volume which has been issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

The diverse elements that exercise political power are examined; from soldiers to students, from peasants and immigrants to industrialists and the church. An appendix lists some 80 *successful* Latin American military coups in the short span of 40 years up to 1966. Mexico and Uruguay are distinguished by their omission from the list (and Chile since 1932); Mr. Nun seeks to interpret this phenomenon but, perhaps inevitably, he cannot offer any basic guidelines for those who seek stability instead of revolution by the military which itself so often claims to be acting for the maintenance of social and economic stability.